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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: RACE, VAGUENESS, AND THE




In June, 1992, the Chicago City Council passed a loitering
ordinance that gave police officers exceptionally broad power to
disperse any group of two or more people standing in public if
the police suspect that the group includes a gang member.! Any
person who does not promptly obey an order to disperse is sub-
ject to arrest and six months in prison. The law's language is
deliberately expansive to allow the police to clean up the streets
based on their suspicions of gang membership rather than wait-
ing for a crime to take place. During the three years the law was
in effect, it yielded arrests of more than 40,000 citizens, most of
whom were Black or Latino residents of inner-city neighbor-
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Faculty Fellow, Institute for Pol-
icy Research, Northwestern University. I presented a draft of this Foreword at a fac-
ulty workshop at Washington University School of Law and thank the participants for
their very helpful comments and suggestions. I owe special thanks to Stephen Schul-
hofer for his engaging discussion and written comments on an earlier draft. I am also
grateful to Paul Butler, Bernardine Dohrn, Steven Drizin, Harvey Grossman, Bernard
Harcourt, Maurice Lipson, Jeffrey Sharer, and Benjamin Wolf for generously sharing
their insights and information about the Morales case, Monica Neuman for her dedi-
cated research assistance, and Lesliediana Jones and Lynn Kincade for expeditious
library services.
' CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICMPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (1992).
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hoods.2 The arrests were halted when the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled in City of Chicago v. Moraless that the gang-loitering
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The United States Su-
preme Court agreed in a six to three decision.4 The Morales case
is one of the Court's "most important law-enforcement rulings
in decades"5 because it bears on the legality of policies recently
initiated in many of the nation's cities that expand police
authority as a means of maintaining order. Around the same
time the Chicago ordinance was passed, for example, New York
City implemented a quality-of-life initiative that directs police to
aggressively make arrests for petty misdemeanor offenses such
as turnstile jumping, panhandling, and public drinking.6 Offi-
cials defend both laws with the theory that by keeping order in
the streets police will deter more serious crime. The two policies
are distinct in an important respect, however. While New York
City's quality-of-life initiative involves arrests for clearly defined
criminal offenses, Chicago's ordinance gave the police discre-
tion to define permissible public presence.
Local policies that delegate to police greater authority to
maintain order are sometimes confused with a related innova-
tion called community policing.7 According to its advocates,
2American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Background on Chicago's Anti-Gang Loi-
tering Ordinance (Oct. 17, 1997). Sixty of the sixty-six defendants in Morales, whose
cases were randomly consolidated by the court, were Black or Latino. Telephone in-
terview with Harvey Grossman, Director, ACLU of Illinois (April 14, 1999). Neigh-
borhood organizations that supported the ordinance conceded that it primarily
affected inner-city minority communities. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago
Neighborhood Organizations in Support of Petitioner at 19, City of Chicago v. Mora-
les, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No 97-1121).
'687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997), affd, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
4 Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). I capitalize the 'B' in "Black" because I
believe that most Black Americans consider themselves to be an ethnic group,
whereas I believe that most white Americans do not.
'Judy Peres, City's Loitering Law Gets Last Chance at Top Court, Cm. TRm., Dec. 8, 1998,
§ 1, at 1.
'For a description and critique of NewYork City's quality-of-life initiative, see Bernard
E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deter-
rence, the Broken Windows Theo2y, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH.
L. Rav. 291 (1998).
7 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1160-61 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, The Coming
Crisis] (referring loosely to discretionary policing strategies including anti-loitering
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community policing is an "organizational strategy" that inte-
grates police departments into the community to make them
more responsive to citizens' demands.8 Although order-
maintenance and community-policing programs sometimes
overlap, I prefer to keep the two terms separate. Order-
maintenance policing policies do not necessarily involve com-
munities in either their design or implementation. Community
policing, on the other hand, need not include laws that expand
police discretion to maintain order or encourage arrests for mi-
nor offenses. Indeed, some types of community policing limit
police power and discourage misdemeanor arrests to facilitate
interaction between officers and the community.9
Acknowledging the potential for police abuse, the Supreme
Court has held in several important decisions that vague loiter-
ing laws violate constitutional requirements of due process.10
Laws that give police a wide net to trap citizens who look dan-
gerous not only fail to give adequate notice to citizens of the na-
ture of offending behavior but also allow police to discriminate
against citizens based on personal prejudices. The Morales deci-
sion re-affirmed the due process limits on statutory grants of
expansive police discretion.
For the last several decades, conservative commentators
have called for a relaxation of the vagueness doctrine as well as
procedural restraints on police discretion to permit bolder law
laws, warrantless building searches, and New York City's quality-of-life initiative as the
.new community policing").
8 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNE=r, COMMUNIT POLICING, CHICAGO STMEL
5 (1997). Community policing "implies a commitment to helping neighborhoods
solve crime problems on their own, through community organizations and crime-
prevention programs." Id
9 See Harcourt, supra note 6, at 388-89 & n.388 (citingJonathan Eig, Eyes on the Street:
Community Policing in Chicago, 19 AM. PROSPECT 60, 63 (Nov.-Dec. 1996)). The Chi-
cago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety vehemently opposed the gang-loitering ordi-
nance because it hindered community policing by breeding suspicion and division
among inner-city residents. See CHICAGO ALLIANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY,
CHICAGO AIfLANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY IS FOR THE CONSTITUIION, AGAINST THE
ANTI-GANG LOITERING LAW (undated pamphlet, on file with author).
0 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also
John C. Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv.
189, 215-16 (1989) (noting the susceptibility of loitering laws to constitutional chal-
lenge on vagueness grounds).
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enforcement efforts to investigate, punish, and prevent crime."
More recently, legal scholars borrowing from sociological theory
have argued that the role of social norms in criminal behavior
also suggests that it is time to curtail or abandon certain consti-
tutional checks on police power to maintain order. 2  These
proponents of order-maintenance policing rely on the "broken
windows" hypothesis, originally advanced by James Q. Wilson
and George L. Kelling, which posits that eliminating visible
signs of neighborhood disorder deters more serious crime.'8 A
virtually unanimous chorus of scholars, politicians, and the me-
dia has championed policing strategies based on the broken
windows theory and credited these strategies with falling crime
rates across the nation. 4 Morales invited the Court to reconsider
its condemnation of vague loitering laws in light of this trend in
law enforcement theory and practice.
The Morales case was decided without much attention to
race. Race did not play a role in either the Illinois Supreme
Court's opinion overturning the Chicago ordinance or the
United States Supreme Court's affirmance. Yet issues of race
are critical to the constitutionality of the gang-loitering law from
" See, e.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JuSTIcE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III, eds., 1998) (including proposals to abolish the Miranda rule);
HAROLD J. RoTHwAx, GuILy: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1995) (advocating
the reform of the criminal justice system, including constraints on the exclusionary
rule and the right to counsel); H. RICHARD UVmI.ER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED
PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments excessively hamper law enforce-
ment); William Barr, A Practical Solution to Crime in Our Communities, 1 MICH. L. &
POL'Y REV. 393, 394 (1996) (advocating pretrial detention power and vagrancy and
anti-loitering laws as important legal tools that will enable "the community to take
back the streets"); Christo Lassiter, The Stop and Frisk of Criminal Street Gang Members,
14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1995) (advocating stops and frisks of suspected gang members
as a means of addressing "Black-on-Black" crime); James Q. Wilson, What to Do about
Crime, 98 COMMENTARY 25, 28 (Sept. 1994) (advocating increased police use of stops
and frisks).
"See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7.
SeeJames Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29.
'4 See Harcourt, supra note 6, at 292-93. Harcourt's article is an important departure
from the "euphoria of support" for the broken windows approach to crime preven-
tion. Recently, that euphoria began to dissipate as commentators linked New York
City's aggressive patrol tactics to cases of police brutality. See infra note 140 and ac-
companying text.
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the perspectives of both its supporters and its opponents. The
disproportionate number of Blacks and Latinos arrested under
the ordinance alone suggests that race mattered in the passage
and enforcement of the ordinance. Racism is also one of the
motivating concerns underlying constitutional objections to
vague loitering laws like the Chicago ordinance. Ironically, race
is also at the center of the strongest argument in favor of up-
holding the ordinance. Some of the law's defenders argue that
Black support for the ordinance demonstrates its efficacy at pro-
tecting inner-city communities from crime and outweighs con-
cerns about the violations of citizens' civil liberties.' 5
Given the predominance of race in the arguments both for
and against the gang-loitering ordinance, the debate about its
constitutionality should carefully address the relation between
this and similar order-maintenance policing measures and Black
Americans' political and social status. Is the disproportionate
arrest of people of color under the ordinance evidence of racial
discrimination, or evidence that the Chicago Police Department
is finally starting to protect the city's minority communities
against internal disorder? Does the apparent support of many
inner-city residents for new policing techniques trump constitu-
tional arguments based on the racial disparity in the arrests? To
borrow the terms of the sociological theorists, are the social
norms enforced by order-maintenance policing beneficial or
detrimental to African Americans given current political condi-
tions?
In this Foreword, I endorse the new attention paid to the re-
lationship between sociology and criminal law. I argue, how-
ever, that some social norm theorists have focused too heavily
on questionable evidence that order-maintenance policing has a
positive influence on social norms in Black communities while
ignoring the disturbing potential for these practices to enforce
and magnify racist norms of presumed Black criminality. The
Chicago gang-loitering ordinance in particular entrenches the
racialized division of Americans into the presumptively lawless
whose liberties deserve little protection and the presumptively
" See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations In Support of
Petitioner at 5, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
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law-abiding who are entitled to rule over them. This danger is
an important reason to preserve the constitutional prohibition
against vague delegations of broad police discretion.
Upholding the Chicago ordinance would have legitimated
the already prevalent practice of police harassment of Blacks on
city streets. More ominously, it would have reinforced the view
that Blacks are potential criminals for whom police surveillance
and even arrest are mundane occurrences, not warranting con-
stitutional concern. Morales gave the Court a timely opportunity
to shore up its crucial jurisprudence placing constitutional lim-
its on police power. I expose as well the evidentiary, theoretical,
and ethical weakness of arguments that use social norm theory
to support free-wheeling police tactics targeted against minori-
ties.
II. RACE AND THE PROBLEM WITH VAGUENESS
The Supreme Court held that the Chicago gang-loitering
ordinance violated the due process clause of the Constitution
because it was an excessively vague impairment of citizens' per-
sonal liberty to move freely on the streets.16 Although this con-
stitutional flaw can be explained in race-neutral terms, in
Chicago it resulted in a particular racial injury; the gang-
loitering law disproportionately violated the rights of Black and
Latino citizens. 7 One of the main problems with vague statutes
is their capacity to further racial injustice in the criminal justice
system. Examining the relationship between racial inequality
and the vagueness doctrine in the context of Morales helps to il-
luminate the political basis for this important constitutional
shield against police abuse.
Vague statutes pose two problems: when criminal codes fail
to clearly define the offense, citizens may not understand what
conduct is prohibited and police are likely to enforce the law in
an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.1 The Chicago law's
definition of loitering raised both of these problems. The ordi-
nance directed police officers who observe anyone whom they
City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (1999).
17 See supra note 2.
8 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
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reasonably believe to be a gang member standing in any public
place "with no apparent purpose" with one or more other per-
sons to order the entire group to leave the area.1 9 Officers were
permitted to arrest anyone who fails to promptly obey the dis-
persal order.20 The prohibition against remaining in a place
without an "apparent purpose" offers no guidance for determin-
ing what behavior an officer might consider illegal. How can
someone standing on a Chicago sidewalk predict an observing
officer's interpretation of her reason for being there?
This confusion arises not because the statute's words them-
selves are ambiguous, but because they literally encompass so
many innocent acts. The Illinois court pointed out, for exam-
ple, that "a person waiting to hail a taxi, resting on a comer dur-
ing ajog, or stepping into a doorway to evade a rain shower has
a perfectly legitimate purpose in all of these scenarios; however,
that purpose will rarely be apparent to an observer.",2 The Chi-
cago City Council certainly meant to leave these harmless in-
stances outside the law's reach. The United States Supreme
Court similarly noted that the ordinance reaches "a substantial
amount of innocent conduct., 22 Writing for the majority, Justice
John Paul Stevens remarked, "It matters not whether the reason
that a gang member and his father, for example, might loiter
near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a
glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark."23 In either case, an
officer must order the couple to move along if their purpose for
standing there is not obvious.
On the other hand, the City Council clearly did intend that
the gang-loitering ordinance prohibit gang members from con-
gregating in the streets for the apparent purpose of recruiting
members or intimidating residents. Yet this behavior would fall
24 icnitn
outside the literal definition of loitering. These inconsisten-
cies between the ordinance's terms and the legislative intent
9 CHICAGO, ILL, MUNICIPAL CODE, § 8-4015 (1992).
"Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 61.
2 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861.
"Id.
", See Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 229-30.
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suggest that police officers are expected to make subjective
judgments, unrelated to the specific language of the ordinance,
about which citizens to arrest. Rather than coherently delineate
the behavior that the ordinance bans, the City Council left it to
the police to distinguish between criminal and legitimate public
25
presence.
For this reason, the law's broad language was also an invita-
tion to police abuse. Giving police officers the authority to de-
termine on the spot the legality of conduct creates the chief evil
of vague criminal statutes. As the Court recognized in prior de-
cisions, "the most important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
'... the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide-
lines to govern law enforcement.' ' 26 Without these guidelines,
police have a tendency to enforce the law against groups that
they despise.27  The city council deliberately made the law's
reach exceptionally wide "so that persons who are undesirable
in the eyes of the police and prosecutors can be convicted even
though they are not chargeable with any other particular of-
fense."28 The Chicago Police Department took full advantage of
the leeway the ordinance granted. From 1992 until 1995, police
issued over 89,000 orders to disperse and arrested over 42,000
people for disobeying their orders.2 This is the point of vague
Justice Stephen Breyer explained the virtually standardless discretion the law's
terms accorded police officers: "Since one always has some apparent purpose, the so-
called limitation invites, in fact requires, the policeman to interpret the words 'no
apparent purpose' as meaning 'no apparent purpose except for....' And it is in the
ordinance's delegation to the policeman of open-ended discretion to fill in that blank
that the problem lies." Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1866 (Breyer,J., concurring).
26 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)).
27 Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
' Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997).
2Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855. Some of these arrests occurred during massive street
sweeps in Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods. In 1994, for example, the Chicago Po-
lice Department instituted Operation EDGE as part of its campaign to "enforc[e]
drug laws and the anti-gang-loitering ordinance." Rob Olmstead, Cops Taking EDGE
in Crime Battles, CI. SuN-TIMES, July 5, 1994, at 14. Operation EDGE involved street
sweeps by as many as sixty uniformed officers who swooped down on "hot spots" over
a several-hour period to make dozens of arrests. One sweep netted one hundred ar-
rests, sixty-nine of which were for gang loitering. Sweep Nets 100 Arrests, CHI. SUN-
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1995, at 4. George Kelling, one of the authors of Broken Windows, ex-
plicitly criticizes the Chicago Police Department's practice of "streetsweeping" as a
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loitering laws: they permit the police to haul off the streets peo-
ple who look suspicious even though they have committed no
criminal conduct. In fighting its gang problem, the courts con-
cluded, "the city cannot empower the police to sweep undesir-
able persons from the public streets through vague and
arbitrary criminal ordinances. " "
Loitering laws inevitably involve judgments about people's
criminal propensity. They embody legislative predictions about
the likelihood that people engaged in certain activities, bearing
certain characteristics, or belonging to certain groups will en-
gage in criminal activity. This preventive measure is justified as
a means of removing crime-prone people from the streets be-
fore they have a chance to break the law. Loitering laws, then,
give the state an advantage in fighting crime and maintaining
public order. The vaguer the law, the greater the benefit it pro-
vides as a prophylactic tool.31 The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that vague loitering laws' infringement of liberty
outweighs any benefit for law enforcement these laws offer.
3 2
Why should we fear so much the state's power to identify people
with a propensity for crime and to remove them from the streets
when this power might help to guarantee safer neighborhoods?
One answer is that expansive and ambiguous allocations of
police discretion are likely to unjustly burden members of un-
popular or minority groups33 Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville,
perhaps the Supreme Court's most important invalidation of
misunderstanding of the type of order-maintenance he and Wilson advocated.
GEORGE L. KELLING & CAHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNnrIs 23 (1996).
so Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 65.
" For a discussion of the state's increasing use of prophylactic measures to fight
crime, see Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998).
"See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156.
"Expansive prosecutorial discretion is also "a major cause of racial inequality in the
criminal justice system." AngelaJ. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Pivilege of
Discretion, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 13, 16-17 (1998)("[Blecause prosecutors play such a
dominant and commanding role in the criminal justice system through the exercise
of broad, unchecked discretion, their role in the complexities of racial inequality in
the criminal process is inextricable and profound.").
DOROTHYE. ROBERTS
vague loitering laws, suggests this rationale.34  Papachristou in-
volved the convictions of eight defendants for violating a Florida
vagrancy ordinance, including two Black men and two white
women who were stopped while driving together on the main
street in Jacksonville and an organizer for a Black political
group who was standing on a downtown street waiting for a
friend. Papachristou dealt a blow to state vagrancy laws passed by
most Southern states during the Jim Crow era as part of a re-
gime of official white supremacy.-5 In striking down the Jack-
sonville ordinance, the Court emphasized its impact on groups
disfavored by the majority:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordi-
nance-poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be re-
quired to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed
appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here,
there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted
by the ordinance, the scheme ... furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against




See generally Papachristou. But see Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra note 24, at 227 (not-
ing that Papachristou "did not invent the 'void for vagueness' doctrine, and the pur-
pose of this doctrine was not to combat institutionalized racism or black political
disempowerment."). Benjamin Franklin expressed the principle underlying the con-
demnation of vague loitering laws in universal terms: "They that can give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." People
ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 623 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2513 (1997). By focusing on the racial im-
pact of vague loitering laws, I do not mean to discount the universal constitutional
principles embodied in the courts' condemnation of these laws. These principles
predate judicial concern with institutionalized racism and would provide important
protections even in a racially homogeneous society. In a society characterized by ra-
cial inequality, however, the pernicious features of vague laws are likely to be imposed
upon disempowered racial groups, and may not be experienced by privileged groups
at all. This racial discrimination, then, is an integral part of the law's due process vio-
lation and a central reason for limiting police discretion.
Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in
Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2261-62 (1998).
-6 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (citation omitted).
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The state's presumption that individuals who violated the ordi-
nance were potential criminals, the Court concluded, was "too
precarious" a basis for violating the even-handed rule of law.
7
Justice Douglas, the author of the Papachristou opinion, had
elaborated this minority-protecting rationale of vagueness doc-
trine in an earlier law review article.38 Douglas argued that the
minority groups who were typically subjected to vague loitering
statutes needed strong constitutional safeguards because these
groups lacked "the prestige to prevent an easy laying-on of
hands by the police." 9 The majority cannot be trusted to bal-
ance fairly the liberty interests of devalued minority groups who
bear the brunt of vague loitering laws against the majority's in-
terest in law and order. °
The disproportionate arrest of minorities in Chicago is typi-
cal of the racial breakdown of arrests for this type of misde-
meanor offense in cities across the country. In 1995, 46.4% of
persons arrested for vagrancy and 58.7% of persons arrested for
suspicion in cities in the United States were Black although
Blacks made up only 13% of city population.4 ' Evidence of ra-
cial discrimination buttressed the Ohio Supreme Court's deci-
sion to strike down a municipal ordinance that prohibited
loitering for drug-related purposes.42 Noting arrest statistics that
showed that police enforced the ordinance "almost exclusively
37 id. at 171.
SeeWilliam 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE LJ. 1 (1960).
9 kat 13.
40 See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 6, at 1155-60 (asserting a political
process theory rationale for Fourth Amendment protections); William J. Stuntz, Im-
plicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 560
(1992) ("[Mlost people probably would approve of greater police authority to keep
an eye on 'undesirables' (and to keep them of out of 'nice' neighborhoods). That is
why old-style loitering and vagrancy laws were politically tolerable, notwithstanding
their stunning breadth").Justice Antonin Scalia is completely oblivious to this danger
when he argues in dissent, "[t]he minor limitation upon the free state of nature that
this prophylactic arrangement imposed on all Chicagoans seemed to them (and it
seems to me) a small price to pay for liberation of their streets." Morales, 119 S. Ct. at
1867 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). The law's infringement on liberty may
have seemed to a majority of Chicagoans a small price to pay precisely because it was
imposed on a minority community and not on them.
41 Harcourt, supra note 6, at 299.
42 City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993).
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against African-Americans," the court concluded that "[t] he in-
ference is clear: police are more likely to believe that a Black
person is loitering 'under circumstances manifesting the pur-
pose to engage in drug-related activity' than they are to believe
that a white person is."
48
As I discuss in Part IMl, the racial disparity in loitering arrests
is part of pervasive discrimination by police officers in their de-
cisions to stop, detain, and arrest Black citizens.' The discre-
tion police officers have to decide who to stop and whether to
make an arrest generally contributes to racial discrimination in
police conduct.4 The practical effect of deference to police
judgment of reasonable suspicion "is the assimilation of police
officers' subjective beliefs, biases, hunches, and prejudices into
law."46 The discriminatory impact of discretion is magnified
tremendously by laws that leave not only the determination of
suspicion but the very definition of offending conduct almost
entirely to an officer's judgment.
The peculiar scope of the Chicago ordinance made it espe-
cially likely that police would target minority youth. The ordi-
nance permits arresting officers to disrupt a gathering based on
their suspicion that one person is a gang member. Identifica-
tion of someone as a gang member is highly associated with his
race. Police not only believe that most gang members belong to
minority groups; they also believe that many, if not most, inner-
city minority youth are gang members. Astonishing proportions
of Black youth appear on the police lists of probable gang
members in some cities. In Denver and Los Angeles, for exam-
Id at 147-48 (quoting the Akron, Ohio ordinance at issue in the case). The arrest
statistics revealed that the ordinance was enforced in areas that had a disproportion-
ately high percentage of African-American residents and that those arrested were dis-
proportionately African-American compared to the general population of the areas in
which arrests occurred. Id. At 147. "This means that even in areas where the popula-
tion is almost evenly racially mixed, the overwhelming number of arrests are of Afri-
can-Americans." Id. at 148.
" See notes 107-130 infra and accompanying text.
' Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 373 & n.176
(1998) (citing sources that show how unrestrained police discretion leads to racist po-
lice behavior, "Discretionary police authority may generate discriminatory searches
and seizures."); Davis, supra note 33, at 27.
46 Davis, supra note 33, at 27.
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pie, nearly half of the cities' young Black men have been
marked as suspected gang bangers. In these cities, virtually any
group of Black teenagers standing on an inner-city street would
risk arrest for violating a gang-loitering law.
Regulations implementing the gang-loitering ordinance
also tended to single out minority youth for arrest. The General
Order providing guidelines to police restricted enforcement to
designated areas frequented by gang members and significantly
affected by gang presence.49 Because Chicago is a highly segre-
gated city,0 applications of the criminal laws to particular
neighborhoods in the city are likely to have a racially disparate
impact.
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg based their opinion
invalidating the gang-loitering ordinance on the "freedom to
loiter for innocent purposes."51 This aspect of liberty guaran-
teed by the due process clause does more than protect the per-
sonal enjoyment one experiences when freely strolling the
streets. It also prevents the state from interfering in the mobil-
ity of subordinated groups within the community and the na-
41 Sheryl Stolberg, 150,000 Are in Gangs, Report by D.A. Claims, L.A. TIMES, May 22,
1992, at Al; DirkJohnson, 2 of 3 Young Black Men in Denver Listed by Police as Suspected
Gangsters, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 11, 1993, at 8. The Chicago ordinance also directed the
police department to maintain "Gang Information Files" containing the names ofju-
veniles and adults the department has probable cause to believe are members of
criminal street gangs. CHIcAGO, ILL. POLICE DEP'T GENERAL ORDER No. 92-4, § VI
(A) (5) (Aug. 8, 1992). Ray Risley, Deputy Chief of Detectives with the Chicago Police
Department, identifies 60% of Chicago's street gangs as African-American, 35% as
Hispanic, 4% as white, and 1% as Asian. Ray Risley, A police officer's perspective on gangs,
drugs, and guns on the streets of Chicago, 18 THE COMPILER 4, 4 (Fall 1998).
' Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 20 n.33, City of Chicago v. Morales 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-
1121); Matthew Mickle Wedegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nui-
sance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423
(1999) (noting that criteria used in California to identify gang members are highly
subjective and imprecise; "virtually every young African-American or Latino male liv-
ing in neighborhoods where gangs are active satisfies one or more of these criteria.").
" CcAGO, IL. POLICE DEP'T GENERAL ORDER No. 92-4, § VI (A) (1) (Aug. 8, 1992).
The Illinois Criminal Justice Authority, which helps the Chicago Police Department
identify gang "hot spots," reported that between 1987 and 1994, most gang-related
offenses were committed by African-Americans and Latinos. See Daniel Dighton, The
Violence of Street Gangs, 16 THE COMILER 4, 6 (Fall 1996).
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANcYA. DENTON, AMERICANAPARTHEID 76 tbl. 3.4 (1993).
Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857.
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tion. Restricting people's freedom of movement can be a form
of political subjugation. Vagrancy laws originated in the
breakup of the feudal system in England in an attempt by feudal
lords to control their serfs. 2 During the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, these laws served as means of stabilizing the la-
bor force by preventing "masterless" workers from traveling
from their homes in search of higher wages, supporting them-
selves on the streets, and entering unwelcoming communities.
53
In the United States, vagrancy-type laws served the same
function in the regime of white domination of Blacks. The
colonies sought to prevent slave rebellions by enacting laws that
prohibited slaves from traveling without a pass and permitted
slave patrols to arrest slaves on mere suspicion of sedition.5 4 Af-
ter Emancipation, white southerners tied freed Blacks to planta-
tions through Black Codes that punished vagrancy. As the
Court described them, "vagrancy laws were used after the Civil
War to keep former slaves in a state of quasi slavery." 6 A more
contemporary example of the oppressive restriction of move-
ment is the requirement of the apartheid regime in South Af-
rica that Blacks carry passes while traveling in white districts. 7
The mandate that police arrest individuals who do not
promptly disperse and "remove themselves from the area" exac-
erbates this constitutional violation. The obligation to leave
12 See Jeffrey S. Adler, A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 209
(1989); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
615-16 (1956).
"3 Foote, supra note 52, at 615-16.
5" A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATmER OF COLOR 276 (1978); Maclin, supra
note 40, at 335.
"5 THEODORE BRANTNIERWSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 98-99 (1965). See also
ROBERT CRUDEN, THE NEGRO IN RFCONSTRUrION 20 (1969) (describing white South-
erners' fear of Negro mobility during Reconstruction).
6 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1858 n.20.
-
7 See Gabriel Carter, Remembering Water: Overcoming Historical Amnesia in South Africa, 8
COLO. J. INT'L ENvT. L. & POL'Y 359, 369 (1997) (citing KADER ASMAL ET AL.,
RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL
GovERNANcE 131 (2nd ed. 1997)). Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999) (declaring
unconstitutional California welfare reform measure that ties amount of benefits to
durational residency requirements as a violation of citizens' constitutional right to
travel from one state to another); Linda Greenhouse, Newcomers to States Win A Right to
Equal Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, atAl.
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"the area" gives police officers additional discretion to decide
whether someone has complied with their orders by moving far
enough away.58 It also magnifies the racist nature of the law's
control over movement in the city. The ordinance's leave-the-
area requirement might be interpreted as an order to leave the
neighborhood, a site delineated in Chicago by race and ethnic-
ity.59 As amici noted, "[a] law authorizing police to order strang-
ers back to their own neighborhood would make all-too-real the
concerns of Chicago aldermen who compared this ordinance to
South Africa's pass laws."6°
The arrest of the named plaintiff, Jesus Morales, illustrates
the law's potential for racial bias. Morales was arrested when he
stood on a street corner with five other Latino teenagers in a
predominantly white neighborhood. The arresting officer testi-
fied that he initially approached the group "[b]ecause we
wanted to know if they lived in the neighborhood."6 1 He con-
cluded that Morales was a gang member because Morales wore
blue and black clothes, the colors of the Gangster Disciples
street gang.62 It appears that Morales became the subject of sus-
picion because of his ethnicity: being Latino made his presence
in a white neighborhood alarming; it also made it seem likely
that his clothing signified gang membership. Vague loitering
laws give license to police officers to arrest people purely on the
basis of race-based suspicions like these.
III. RACE, SocIAL NORM THEORY, AND THE ARGUMENT FOR
POLICE DISCRETION
The preceding discussion of vagueness doctrine shows that
race plays a key role in the long-standing constitutional objec-
' Alshuler & Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 233-37 (arguing that the ordinance's most
problematic grant of discretion "lies in the almost unfettered power of an arresting
officer to determine whether a suspect has adequately complied with a police order
to disperse.").
'" Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al., as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 23, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-
1121).
60 Id.
6, City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 n. 21 (Il1. 1997).
62 Id.
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tions to expansive police discretion authorized by vague laws
such as the gang-loitering ordinance. More recent arguments
about criminal law's impact on social norms have also begun to
focus on issues of race. Leading social norm theorists contend
that order-maintenance policing benefits communities, particu-
larly Black inner-city neighborhoods, because promoting norms
of orderliness deters crime. I argue, however, that the identity
of "visibly lawless" people at the heart of vague loitering laws in-
corporates racist notions of criminality and legitimates police
harassment of Black citizens.
A. THE BROKEN WINDOWS HYPOTHESIS AND SOCIAL NORM
THEORY
The city argued that the gang-loitering ordinance protects
community residents in two ways. First, it prevents the harms
created by gang loitering itself. Hanging out on the street is
part of a strategy to stake out the gang's own territory and to in-
timidate residents or antagonize rival gangs who enter it.63 Gang
loitering makes law-abiding residents fearful to venture into the
street and creates a danger that violent clashes that imperil in-
nocent passersby might erupt in public. Thus, the city claimed,
the very presence of gang members on the streets creates a
menace independent of any additional criminal activity they
might be engaging in. Second, disrupting gang loitering helps
to prevent future offenses by gang members. Gang members
who congregate in the street are often engaged in crimes such
as drug dealing or conspiring to break the law that are difficult
for police officers to intercept. Membership in a criminal en-
terprise also makes it likely that gang bangers will commit
crimes in the future.
The city defended the crime prevention function of the
gang-loitering ordinance by relying on the broken windows the-
sis. In an Atlantic Monthly article, "Broken Windows," crimi-
nologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling criticized law
enforcement strategies focused on investigating the most seri-
ous crimes on the grounds that they overlooked the important
function of maintaining public order. According to Wilson and
63 Brief for the Petitioner at 3, 14, Morales, (No 97-1121).
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Kelling, visible signs of community disorder such as vagrancy
and vandalism encourage lawless residents to commit crimes:
Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a win-
dow in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the win-
dows will soon be broken.... [O]ne unrepaired broken window is a
signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs
nothing .... We suggest that 'untended' behavior also leads to the
breakdown of community controls.64
They argued that governments can reduce crime more effec-
tively by addressing visible signs of disorder that influence
criminal behavior. The city cited this theory to support its claim
that the gang-loitering ordinance achieved a prophylactic objec-
tive "because when police officers can order gang members to
move along, they can prevent crime before it occurs."
Legal scholars interested in the relationship between crime
and social norms have embraced the broken windows theory as
part of their explanation of deterrence and prescription for
criminal law.6' Social norm theory augments the traditional
economic conception of deterrence by recognizing that the de-
cisions of individuals to commit crimes are influenced by their
social context as well as by the price of crime. Criminal behav-
ior is shaped by individuals' perceptions of others' values, be-
liefs, and conduct. Perceptions of community norms of
orderliness in particular have an impact on residents' willing-
ness to commit crimes. As Kahan explains, "[d]isorder is ...
pregnant with meaning: Public drunkenness, prostitution, ag-
gressive panhandling and similar behavior signal ... that the
community is unable or unwilling to enforce basic norms. 67
" Wilson & Kelling, supra note 13, at 31.
'Brief for the Petitioner at 10, Morales, (No 97-1121).
" See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan-
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, Be-
tween Economic and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 2477 (1997);
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349
(1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and
Drug Law Enforcement 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191 (1998) [hereinafter Meares, Social Or-
ganization].
'7 Kahan, Social Influence supra note 66, at 370.
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Adopting the broken windows thesis, these social norm theorists
assert that community disorder frightens law abiders from using
the streets and cooperating with police while leading law break-
ers to conclude that crime is not risky or morally repugnant.
Thus, the social meaning of disorder can influence the behavior
of both committed law-abiders and law-breakers in a way that is
likely to increase crime.&
Social norm theorists also point to the role the law plays in
shaping these social influences. The state can discourage crime
by producing the right kind of social meaning through the
regulation of social norms. "Norms of order are critical to keep-
ing social influence pointed away from, rather than toward,
criminality," writes Kahan. 69 When government authorities en-
force norms of orderliness they signal to residents that the
community values basic norms and is in control of the environ-
ment, thereby influencing citizens to refrain from committing
serious crimes. Some social norm theorists rely on the social in-
fluence conception of deterrence to advocate law enforcement
strategies that maintain visible order, such as New York City's
quality-of-life initiative and Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance.
Rejecting tough criminal penalties for gang membership as
counterproductive, Kahan argues:
A more effective approach is to attack the public signs and cues that
informjuveniles' (mis)perception that their peers value gang criminality.
That's what gang-loitering laws attempt to do. By preventing gangs from
openly displaying their authority, such laws counteract the perception
that gang members enjoy a high status in the community. As that per-
ception recedes, so does the perceived reputational pressure to join
them.7"
By counteracting the harmful social meaning that gangs control
the community, and thereby deterring more dangerous gang
activity, gang-loitering laws reduce crime more effectively than
costly imprisonment for violent offenses.
68 Id. at 370-71.
0 Id. at 391.
71 Id. at 375-76.
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Social norm theory also has implications for existing consti-
tutional limits on police power. Advocates of order-
maintenance policing argue that courts should relax restraints
on police discretion to enable police to remove signs of chronic
disorder on the streets.7' Some social norm theorists endorse
this view because of the way due process rights undermine de-
terrence.72 Rights that constrain police authority to suppress
disorder move social influence in a negative direction by inhibit-
ing the community's power to enforce norms of orderliness.
This negative effect on social meaning, which cannot be offset
by increasing the severity of punishment, makes rights more
costly than current constitutional rules contemplate. Social
norm theory, utilizing the broken windows hypothesis, provides
an influential defense for weakening the constitutional shield
against racially biased detention and arrest. Is this proposed
shift in the balance between liberty and state powerjustified?
B. THE FLAWED EMPIRICAL CASE FOR LOITERING LAWS
Before examining the political grounds for the constitu-
tional retrenchment proposed by social norm theorists, we
should test the strength of their empirical assertions. The bro-
ken windows hypothesis makes an empirical claim of deter-
rence: eliminating visible signs of disorder deters serious crime.
Social norm theorists contend that falling crime rates in cities
that have implemented order-maintenance policing initiatives
prove the broken windows hypothesis. Tracey Meares defends
" See supra note 9. In Fixing Broken Windows, on the other hand, Kelling and Coles de-
clare the constitutional limits of the broken windows approach to crime prevention:
"Clearly, all police actions involved in order maintenance would have to be grounded
in law and subject to clear constitutional constraints against infringement of individ-
ual liberties." KELUIN.G & COLES, supra note 29, at 23. (Kelling and Coles wrote this
admonition in connection with their criticism of the Chicago Police Department's
practice of "streetsweeping.") Kelling and Coles devote considerable attention to the
question "whether police can be trusted to maintain order equitably, justly, and in
ways that preserve public peace." Id at 164. They acknowledge that the police discre-
tion inevitably involved in order-maintenance "can enforce a tyranny of the majority,
a repression of minority or marginal elements within the community." Id.
" See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1182-85; Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v.
Morales, 1998 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 197 [hereinafter Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Anti-
quated Procedural Thinking].
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the Chicago gang-loitering ordinance by pointing to "the posi-
tive results correlated with its enforcement," noting purported
decreases in city crime during the years the law was in effect.
73
Kahan likewise cites statistics showing the plummeting New York
City crime rate to support that city's quality-of-life initiative, and
states that "[c] ity officials and at least some criminologists credit
the larger reduction in crime rates to [the] recent emphasis on
'order maintenance." 74
In the Morales case, the city also presented crime statistics as
evidence that the loitering ordinance "had a substantial effect
on the level of gang-related violence in Chicago."7 The city ar-
gued that a five-year report on gang violence prepared by the
Police Department revealed a pattern of substantial decline in
gang-related crime after the ordinance was passed, followed by
an increase after police stopped enforcing the law.76
The statistics showing fluctuations in the rate of gang vio-
lence, however, simply so not support the city's claim. The very
report the city cites shows precisely the opposite relationship be-
tween enforcement of the ordinance and rates of violent crime.
In 1994, while the ordinance was in place, gang-related homi-
cides increased faster than other homicides (27% compared to
3%); and in 1997, the second post-enforcement year, gang-
related homicides decreased by 19% at a time when non-gang re-
lated homicides went up slightly.7" Chicago's crime record dur-
ing the early 1990s, therefore, offers no proof that the gang-
loitering ordinance reduced gang violence in the city.
The city, moreover, posited a relationship between sweep-
ing gang members from the streets and crime reduction that is
far more direct than the broken windows theory suggests: "Per-
7" Meares, Social Organization, supra note 60, at 225. As I discuss below, this claim is
not supported by city crime statistics. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
7 4 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 66, at 368-69.
7- Brief for Petitioner at 16, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-
1121).
76 In 1995, the last year the ordinance was enforced, gang-related homicide in the city
dropped faster than other homicides (26% compared to 9%), while the rate jumped
by 7% the following year when the rate of other homicides continued to decrease.
Brief for Petitioner at 16, Morales, (No. 97-1121) (citing Criy OF CmicAOO, GANG AND
NARCOTIC-RELATED CRIME: 1993-1997 (1998)).
CrrY oF ChIcAo, supra note 76.
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haps it is just this simple: if fewer gang members are loitering in
public where they constitute an inviting target for their rivals,
fewer of them-and innocent people nearby-will be shot to
death."78 This argument drastically short circuits social norm
theory, eliminating the process by which the social meaning of
order reinstated by the police influences the attitudes of com-
munity residents. Given the complexity of social norm theory, it
would be surprising if the gang-loitering ordinance really had
such an immediate impact on the attitudes and behavior of
residents.
To the extent crime did drop during this period, Chicago's
experience mirrors a decrease in the commission of serious of-
fenses in other large American cities, and may be related to yet
unexplained national trends.7 A recent report evaluating Chi-
cago's community policing program, CAPS, notes that the
downward trend began before CAPS was implemented and at-
tributes the decline to a variety of factors including high incar-
ceration rates, gun seizures, and decreases in drug use, without
even mentioning the loitering ordinance as a cause. 0 "Given
the myriad factors that influence levels of violence," the Su-
preme Court concluded in Morales, "it is difficult to evaluate the
probative value of this statistical evidence, or to reach any firm
conclusion about the ordinance's efficacy."81
The suggested factors contributing to the decrease in seri-
ous crime in New York City are equally legion. 2 One prominent
explanation is the shift in drug use from crack cocaine to heroin
78 Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
See Geoffrey A. Campbell, Putting a Crimp in Crime: Experts Differ Over Reasons for Fal-
ling Rates of Serious Offenses, 83 A.B.A.J., May 1997, at 24; Alexis Chiu, Crime Rate at 29-
year Low in City, BOSTON GLOBE Aug. 28, 1997, at Al; Gordon Witkin, The Crime Bust,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 25, 1998, at 28, 30-37 (conceding that "the national
causes of the improvement remain mysterious," but attributing the decline in na-
tional crime rates primarily to decreased crack use). Recent economic growth and
relatively low rates of unemployment are under-explored possible reasons for the
drop in crime.
CHICAGO COMMUNITY POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNI=Y POLIING IN
CHIAGO, YEAR FOUR: AN INTERIM REPORT 9 (1998).
Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855 n.7.
8, Fox Butterfield, Reason for Dramatic Drop in Crime Puzzles the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1998, at 16.
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during the 1990s, along with the maturation of the crack mar-
ket. Because a large portion of New York City's homicides in
the late 1980s were related to the crack trade, these changes
may have resulted in less drug-related violence.83 Ironically,
New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir recently at-
tributed the city's plummeting crime rates to "the department's
move away from the community-policing strategies of the early
1990's, which called for more neighborhood officers on the
beat."84 Safir pointed instead to the use of computer maps to
chart crime and assigning officers to major antidrug initiatives
across the city as the causes of crime reduction. Explaining the
recent decline in crime rates across the country remains a hotly
contested topic.
Recent scrutiny of the broken windows theory has more di-
rectly shaken the empirical undergirding of order-maintenance
policing. The strongest empirical support for the broken win-
dows thesis comes from a study conducted by Wesley Skogan, a
political scientist at Northwestern University.85 In Disorder and
Decline, Skogan tested the disorder-causes-crime hypothesis by
aggregating data from previously published studies that inter-
viewed residents of forty neighborhoods in six large cities. Sko-
gan then regressed the rate of robbery victimization on the level
of disorder. Skogan finds that there is a causal relationship be-
tween these measures of crime and disorder, and concludes:
83 See Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime,
Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233
(1999) (providing an ethnographic study of reduction in Brooklyn, New York). Curtis
rejects the claim that crime reduction stemmed from the police department's policy:
"While aggressive policing certainly resulted in a reluctance by many people to linger
in public places,. . . it can hardly account for the profound changes which occurred
in the daily lives of inner city residents." Id. at 1275.
84 Michael Cooper, Homicides Decline Below 1964 Level in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1998, at Al. Mayor Guiliani's quality-of-life initiative may create an impediment to
law enforcement as the criminal courts are unable to handle the surge of minor cases
inundating the system. See David Rohde, A Glut of Minor Cases Swamps City's Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, atA19.
WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990). Disorder and Decline concerns the broader rela-
tionship between disorder and neighborhood decline, and its reanalysis of existing
data on victimization is only a small part of Skogan's study. I focus on Skogan's con-
clusions about a disorder/crime nexus because they are cited as proof of the broken
windows hypothesis. See infra notes 87-88, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 89
1999] FOREWORD: RACE & ORDER-MAIN TENANCE POLICING 797
"These data support the proposition that disorder needs to be
taken seriously in research on neighborhood crime, and that
both directly and through crime it plays an important role in
neighborhood decline."8  Skogan relied on his finding of a
crime/disorder nexus to endorse Wilson and Kelling's hypothe-
sis, asserting "'Broken windows' do need to be repaired
quickly."8 7 Kelling, in turn, claims that Skogan's study "estab-
lished the causal links between disorder and serious crime-
empirically verifying the 'Broken Windows' hypotheses. " 8
After examining the data, law professor Bernard Harcourt
concludes that Skogan's study "does not support the claim that
reducing disorder deters more serious crime.''89 Skogan se-
lected only one crime-robbery-as the dependent variable
even though the data contained a number of other crimes, in-
cluding purse-snatching, physical assault, burglary, and sexual
assault. When Harcourt replicated Skogan's study to include
these other crimes, he discovered that robbery was the only
crime victimization variable that remained significantly related
to disorder when neighborhood poverty, stability, and race are
held constant.0 Sexual assault and purse-snatching are not sig-
nificantly related to disorder, and the statistical relationship be-
tween physical assault and burglary disappears when
socioeconomic factors are taken into account91 In short, Sko-
" See Skogan, supra note 85, at 75.
87 id.
8 KELUNG & COLES, supra note 29, at 24.
89 Harcourt, supra note 6, at 295. Harcourt first identifies several problems with Sko-
gan's data and design decisions. He points out, for example, that a number of the
underlying surveys are missing values for most of the main variables in Skogan's index
of physical and social disorder. Id. at 315-17. Moreover, the independent variable
called "disorder" includes elements such as drug trafficking and gang activity which
overlap with the dependent variable-the level of serious criminal activity. Id. at 317-
19. Analyzing whether disorder is causally related to serious crime becomes tauto-
logical if respondents considered these disorderly activities to be major crimes in
themselves.
'o Id. at 320.
9' Id. at 320-21. Skoganjustifies relying on robbery victimization alone because these
data are more reliable than data on the other crimes. Skogan, supra note 85, at 195
n.1. The small size of neighborhood samples for purse snatching (16 neighbor-
hoods) and rape (24 neighborhoods), and problems with the survey questions for as-
sault victimization were reasons to exclude these crimes. Harcourt points out,
however, that the data on burglary victimization are more reliable than the robbery
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gan's study fails to prove any statistically significant relationship
between disorder and any crime except for robbery.
Harcourt goes on to demonstrate, however, that even the
relationship between disorder and robbery is questionable. It
turns out that a cluster of five Newark neighborhoods exert ex-
cessive influence on the statistical findings. Harcourt reports,
"[h] olding constant the same three explanatory variables (pov-
erty, stability, and race), there is no significant relationship between
disorder and robbery victimization when the five Newark neighborhoods
are excluded.,92 This "Newark Effect" suggests that the neighbor-
hoods in Newark are for some reason skewing the disor-
der/crime results, and should therefore be left out of the study.
In the final step, Harcourt engages in his own disorder-crime
regression analysis, using Skogan's data, that corrects the data
and design problems he identified. Finding no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between disorder and crime, he concludes
that "the data do not support the broken windows hypothesis."3
It appears that the broken windows hypothesis, used by conser-
vative commentators, criminal law theorists, and city officials to
defend a radical expansion of police authority, lacks the empiri-
cal footing its adherents claim.
The confusion over declining crime rates and the nexus be-
tween disorder and crime should undermine the current confi-
dence in the effectiveness of order-maintenance policing.
surveys: there are 10 more neighborhoods for burglary (40 neighborhoods) than for
robbery (30 neighborhoods). Harcourt, supra note 6, at 322; memo from Bernard
Harcourt to Dorothy Roberts (July 5, 1999) (on file with author). Moreover, the typi-
cal question for burglary victimization is by definition neighborhood specific (i.e.,
burglaries necessarily take place in the victim's neighborhood because they occur in
the home), whereas the questions about robbery victimization were not neighborhood
specific. Harcourt, supra note 6, at 322. By replicating Skogan's study, Harcourt's
aim is not to confirm that the victimization data are reliable, but to show that they
cannot be used to prove a causal connection between disorder and serious crime. I
am indebted to both Bernard Harcourt and Wesley Skogan for correspondence clari-
fying their analyses.
Id. at 323 (emphasis in original). Harcourt's exclusion of the five Newark neigh-
borhoods may be criticized for reducing the sample to an unreliable size (from 30
neighborhoods to 25). Harcourt argues that, given the small data set, it is fairer to
exclude these neighborhoods than to include them because they distort the relation-
ship between disorder and crime.
9' 1& at 329.
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Certainly there is insufficient empirical basis for discarding the
well-established constitutional objections to the Chicago loiter-
ing ordinance. Nevertheless, there are other reasons to take se-
riously the application of social norm theory to criminal law.
The public does not endorse new law enforcement strategies
simply because they are effective. We evaluate various ap-
proaches to criminal justice according to moral and political
judgments as much as their impact on crime rates.94 Whether or
not the broken windows thesis is proven to deter crime, we
should examine how law enforcement policies reinforce or con-
test harmful social norms. The central error that social norm
theorists make is their misjudgment of the social influence of
order-maintenance policing, as well as their misreading of the
empirical data about crime and disorder.
C. THE RACIAL MEANING OF ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING
In the middle of writing this Foreword, I had a revealing
conversation with my sixteen-year-old son about police and loi-
tering. I told my son that I was discussing the constitutionality
of a city ordinance that allowed the police to disperse people
talking on the sidewalk if any one of them looked as if he be-
longed to a gang. My son responded apathetically, "What's new
about that? The police do it all the time, anyway. They don't
like Black kids standing around stores where white people shop,
so they tell us to move." He then casually recounted a couple
instances when he and his friends were ordered by officers to
move along when they gathered after school to shoot the breeze
on the streets of our integrated community in New Jersey. He
seemed resigned to this treatment as a fact of life, just another
indignity of growing up Black in America' He was used to being
viewed with suspicion: being hassled by police was similar to the
way store owners followed him with hawk eyes as he walked
, Conversely, even airtight proof that order-maintenance policing reduces serious
crime would not resolve the issue of its justice or morality. While empirical research
can assist us in deciding what justice requires, it cannot replace our concern for jus-
tice.
DOROTHYE. ROBERTS [Vol. 89
through the aisles of neighborhood stores or women clutched
their purses as he approached them on the street.95
Even my relatively privileged son had become acculturated
to one of the salient social norms of contemporary America:
Black children, as well as adults, are presumed to be lawless and
that status is enforced by the police.96 He has learned that as a
Black person he cannot expect to be treated with the same dig-
nity and respect accorded his white classmates. Of course, Black
teens in inner-city communities are subjected to more routine
and brutal forms of police harassment. Along with command-
ing them to move along, police officers often make derogatory
comments, push them around, or throw them against the patrol
car.97 As my son quickly noted, the Chicago ordinance simply
' See McGowan v. Ward Parking Shopping Center Co., No. 98-0836-CV-W-9 (W.D.
Mo., filed July 28, 1998) (alleging security guards at shopping mall ejected African
American teenagers and had them arrested for trespass because of their race). I am
grateful to Beth Colgan for bringing this lawsuit to my attention.
6 Columnist Bob Herbert reports that increased police abuse of Black New Yorkers as
a result of the city's aggressive policing initiative has influenced the survival lessons
Black children learn:
Some parents and civic leaders are teaching black and Hispanic children to
quickly display their hands during any encounter with the police, like little criminals.
This is to show that the youngsters are not armed and therefore should not be blown
into eternity at age 10 or 15 or 20 by a trigger-happy stranger in a blue uniform.
Bob Herbert, A Brewing Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, atA31. See alsoJodi Wilgoren
& Ginger Thompson, After Shooting, An Eroding Trust in Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1999, at Al (quoting African-American captain in Department of Corrections as say-
ing young people in his Bronx neighborhood view the police as "thugs with guns in
blue uniforms").
97 See CHICAGO ALLIANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that
71% of respondents in a survey of 968 Chicago public high school students con-
ducted by CANS reported that they had been stopped by police and many were "sub-
jected to 'racial slurs, name calling, being sworn at, told to shut-up, being threatened
and shoved.' Many described feeling they had been treated like 'a piece of trash,'
'like dirt,' 'like an animal,' 'like a slave."'). Sometimes police abuse of teens turns
deadly. In December, police officers in Riverside, California, shot Tyisha Miller, a
Black 19-year-old girl, 12 times as she sat in her car at a gas station, waiting for assis-
tance with a flat tire. Lisa O'Neill Hill, State DA Invited To Review of Police in Miller
Shooting, Tm PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA),Jan. 16, 1999, at B5. Police officers'
claim that Miller reached for a gun when an officer broke the car window is disputed
by her relatives. See 300 Protest Police Shooting, HOUSTON CHRO NiCLE, Jan. 5, 1999, at 4.
See also, Jager v. Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo. 1982) (attributing police
killing of teen to negligent training and supervision).
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codifies a police practice that is already prevalent in Black
communities across America.9 8 But the city council's imprima-
tur and the power of the police to enforce their orders with ar-
rest, conviction, and incarceration powerfully validate the
harmful message of presumed Black criminality. If the United
States Supreme Court had upheld the gang-loitering ordinance,
what used to be criticized as police harassment might have been
applauded as an innovative policing strategy.
1. The Law-Abiding/Lawless Dichotomy
To understand the social influence of order-maintenance
policing, we must uncover the implicit assumptions it makes
about people's criminal propensity. The theory underpinning
the gang-loitering ordinance relies on a dichotomy between two
kinds of inner-city residents-those who are lawless and those
who are law-abiding. By clearing the streets of gang members
and people who congregate with them, the theory goes, the po-
lice deter lawless residents from committing future crimes and
make neighborhoods safer for law-abiding residents. This dis-
tinction eliminates the need for a criminal conviction before the
state may punish or incapacitate lawless people. As the city ar-
gued before the Supreme Court, "surely it is no answer to law-
abiding residents, who no longer feel safe when they go out-
doors, to wait for someone to eventually be incarcerated as a re-
sult of a conviction on a serious felony charge."9' The state may
deprive lawless citizens of their liberties immediately to protect
the freedom of law-abiding citizens.
" See Alshuler & Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 230 ("In the anti-gang loitering ordi-
nance, the council effectively awarded the police a hassling license with teeth."). In
the early 1980's the Chicago Police Department implemented another racially-biased
strategy for removing disorderly people from the streets. Police officers arrested
hundreds of thousands of Blacks and Latinos for disorderly conduct with no inten-
tion of prosecuting the charges. Barbara Brotman, ACLU lawsuit seeks to halt 'harass-
ment' arrests of minorities, Cmn. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1983, § 2, at 3. People who were picked
up routinely spent a night injail and were released the following day when the arrest-
ing officer failed to appear in court. Id. A federal lawsuit filed by the ACLU challeng-
ing the practice ended in a settlement that provided for the city to pay damages to
the plaintiffs and required police to appear in court on disorderly conduct arrests.
"Street Sweep" Suit Settled, Cm. SurN-TIms, Aug. 7, 1990, at 10.
"Brief for the Petitioner at 14, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No.
97-1121).
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This categorization of citizens is an inherent feature of the
social influence conception of deterrence. Social norm theo-
rists borrow from the broken windows theory both its explana-
tion of how disorder influences criminal behavior and its
categorical distinction between orderly and disorderly people.'o
According to Kahan, signs of disorder encourage "individuals
who are otherwise inclined to engage in crime" to do so, while
pressuring "committed law-abiders" to leave the neighbor-
hood. 1' As Bernard Harcourt helpfully elucidates, this explana-
tion for crime assumes two types of people who respond to
disorder in opposite ways:
Running through the social influence explanation and the broken
windows theory is a recurrent and pervasive dichotomy between, what we
could call in vulgar terms, honest people and the disorderly; between
"committed law-abiders" and "individuals who are otherwise inclined to
engage in crime;" between "families who care for their homes, mind
each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders"
and "disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhan-
diers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the men-
tally disturbed." 12
. According to social influence theory, neighborhood disor-
der frightens honest, law-abiding citizens into remaining at
home or moving out of the community altogether. The same
neighborhood disorder, on the other hand, attracts lawless
people to move in and encourages them to commit serious
crimes. The public presence of gangs, the city of Chicago ar-
gued, caused orderly residents to refrain from venturing on to
the streets while fomenting shootouts and drug dealing by dis-
orderly residents.
The Chicago ordinance takes this dichotomy between or-
derly and disorderly people, law-abiders and law-breakers one
dangerous step further. The ordinance not only divides the
world into two distinct categories of people based on their pro-
" Harcourt, supra note 6, at 305.
"' Kahan, Social Influence, sura note 66, at 370-71.
102 Harcourt, supra note 6, at 297 (citations omitted) (quoting Kahan, Social Influence,
supra note 66 and Wilson & Kelling, supra note 13).
[Vol. 89
1999] FOREWORD: RACE & ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICNG 803
pensity to commit crimes; it also assumes that the police can dis-
tinguish between these types of people independent of any criminal
conduct. The city's brief in the Supreme Court refers over and
over again to the citizens the ordinance subjects to arrest as
"visibly lawless" people. The lawlessness of these people is visible
in two senses. First, their criminality is evidenced by visible
characteristics other than their criminal behavior. They look like
criminals even when they are doing no more than standing still.
Second, lawless people themselves are visible signs of disorder.
Their very presence on the streets is considered harmful and must
be eradicated. In short, the police can identify "visibly lawless"
residents on sight and are justified in excluding them from pub-
lic to deter the commission of serious crimes.
2. Identifying "Visibly Lawless"People
The efficacy of the gang-loitering ordinance, then, is prem-
ised on the ability of Chicago police officers to identify "visibly
lawless" people and to distinguish them from law-abiding citi-
zens. How do police make these distinctions? How does one
tell a disorderly from an orderly individual? The categories em-
ployed by social norm theorists when they defend aggressive po-
licing are not natural groupings with fixed and uncontested
delineation.'" Rather, they derive from two main sources that
social norm theorists leave surprisingly unexamined-the polic-
ing strategy itself and pernicious social norms already in place
when the policing strategy is implemented. Evaluating the so-
ciological defense of the gang-loitering law must include a care-
ful examination of the category of "visibly lawless" people who
the law is designed to remove from the streets. The following
examination of the law's dichotomy shows that it incorporates
racist social norms that help to perpetuate stereotypes of Black
criminality. This negative social influence refutes the claim that
the order privileged by order-maintenance policing upholds
only positive community norms.
Harcourt persuasively demonstrates the relationship be-
tween the NewYork quality-of-life initiative and the definition of
"'Harcourt, supra note 6, at 354.
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the disorderly people it regulates. Relying on the work of Mi-
chel Foucault, Harcourt argues that the categories underlying
the broken windows theory of crime prevention do not exist in-
dependently of the law enforcement policies supported by the
theory.104 "To the contrary," Harcourt asserts, "the category of
the disorderly is itself a reality produced by the method of polic-
ing."' ° It is the technique of order-maintenance policing-ag-
gressively arresting people for minor infractions such as
panhandling and littering-that creates the profile of the disor-
derly person who must be watched, controlled, and relocated.
Social norm theorists, then, are wrong to use an assumed dis-
tinction between orderly and disorderly people to justify order-
maintenance policing because no such categorical distinction
pre-dates the policing strategy itself. Instead of merely influenc-
ing these categories of individuals, order-maintenance policing
actually helps shape or create these categories. Instead of sim-
ply influencing community norms, it imposes norms on the
community.
6
Harcourt's explication of the category-creating function of
order-maintenance policing reveals a devastating fallacy in the
social influence theory of deterrence. Social norm theorists are
amazingly uncritical of the categories they employ, failing to ac-
knowledge that these identities do not have a natural and fixed
reality. These categories, however, are not created by policing
strategies alone. While aggressive policing techniques impose
norms on the community, they also reinforce pre-existing no-
tions of criminality, disorder, and lawlessness. This is particu-
1 Id. at 354-77.
'
0 5 Id. at 297.
'MId. at 353. For a similar critique of a "prostitution free zone" ordinance, which uses
trespass law to permit the police to eject women identified as prostitutes from public
places, see Lisa E. Sanchez, Enclosure Acts and Exclusionary Practices: Neighborhood Asso-
ciatidns, Community Police and the Expulsion of the Sexual Outlaw as Other, in BETWEEN
LAW AND CULTURE: TBE IDENTrims Cits IN SOCO-LEGAL ScHOLARSHIP (Lisa Bower et
al. eds., forthcoming 1999). Professor Sanchez, a sociologist, describes the ordinance
as "a spatial form of governance that seeks to enclose a boundary around the
lifespaces of privileged, propertied residents by excluding the visibly sex-
ual/sexualized body of the prostitute." Id. at 6. Sanchez notes that the anti-
prostitution ordinance, like vagrancy laws, imposes an outlaw identity on women sub-
jected to the law and then uses that identity as a basis for geographic exclusion. Id. at
23.
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larly true of loitering laws like the Chicago ordinance that rely
on characteristics other than criminal conduct to identify of-
fenders. Standing on a street comer is a sign of disorder only
when it is engaged in by "visibly lawless" people. When "law-
abiding" neighbors gather to chat in front of their homes or
businesses it is seen as a sign of a vibrant community. Defining
visibly lawless people adopts America's longstanding association
between blackness and criminality.
One of the main tests in American culture for distinguish-
ing law-abiding from lawless people is their race. Many, if not
most, Americans believe that Black people are "prone to vio-
lence" and make race-based assessments of the danger posed by
strangers they encounter.0 7 The myth of Black criminality is
part of a belief system deeply embedded in American culture
that is premised on the superiority of whites and inferiority of
Blacks. l0 " Stereotypes that originated in slavery are perpetuated
today by the media'19 and reinforced by the huge numbers of
Blacks under criminal justice supervision."0 As Jody Armour
puts it, "it is unrealistic to dispute the depressing conclusion
that, for many Americans, crime has a black face."'
One of the most telling reflections of the association of
Blacks with crime is the biased reporting of crime by white vic-
tims and eyewitnesses. Psychological studies show a substantially
greater rate of error in cross-racial identifications when the wit-
7Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and In-
voluntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994). A 1990 University of Chicago
study found that "over 56 percent of Americans consciously believe that blacks tend
to be 'violence prone.'" Id. (citing Tom W. Smith, Ethnic Images 9, 16 (Dec.
1990) (General Social Survey Topical Report No. 19)).
"a See GEORGE FREDRICESON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHrrE MIND 256-82 (1971);JOEL
WaIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHrrE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SouTH
SINCE EMANCIPATION 111-21 (1984).
'" See Ishmael Reed, Tuning Out Network Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A25.
... See Tracey Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 678 (1998) ("It ap-
pears fairly clear that the disproportionate involvement of minorities (African Ameri-
cans in particular) in the criminal justice system generally stigmatizes all minorities,
whether they are categorized as law breakers or law abiders.").
. Armour, supra note 107, at 787; see also ELJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS
AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNriY 208 (1990) ("The public awareness is color-
coded: white skin denotes civility, law-abidingness, and trustworthiness, while African-
American skin is strongly associated with poverty, crime, incivility, and distrust.").
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ness is white and the suspect is Black.112 White witnesses dispro-
portionately misidentify Blacks because they expect to see Black
criminals. According to Sheri Lynn Johnson, "[t]his expecta-
tion is so strong that whites may observe an interracial scene in
which a white person is the aggressor, yet remember the black
person as the aggressor." s The unconscious association be-
tween Blacks and crime is so powerful that it supersedes reality:
it predisposes whites to literally see Black people as criminals.
Their skin color marks Blacks as visibly lawless.
Race helped to make the Blacks and Latinos arrested under
the Chicago ordinance appear lawless. With no criminal con-
duct to go by, police officers probably used race as a critical fac-
tor in judging whether an individual might be a gang member.
A group of Black or Latino teenagers simply standing on an in-
ner-city street comer is far more likely to be considered disor-
derly than a group of white teenagers similarly congregating in
their community. A "law-abiding" Black Chicagoan had a far
greater chance of being mistakenly ordered to move than his
white counterparts. My point goes beyond the observation that
the loitering law happened to result in the arrest of a dispropor-
tionate number of minorities. By necessarily assuming a distinc-
tion between law-abiding and lawless people that can be
detected apart from criminal conduct, the gang-loitering ordi-
nance incorporates and reinforces pernicious stereotypes about
Black criminality.
Police officers are particularly notorious for using race as a
proxy for criminal propensity. Police routinely consider an in-
'" See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 934, 949 (1984).
3Id. at 950-51. See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagey in Criminal Cases, 67 TuL.
L. REv. 1739 (1993) (describing the manipulation of racial fears and stereotypes in
criminal trials). White defendants in self-defense cases "exploit the racial prejudices
ofjurors in asserting the reasonableness of their fear of supposed assailants who are
black." Armour, supra note 107, at 783. The disturbing acceptance of race-based evi-
dence and arguments in self-defense cases is illustrated by the acquittal of Bernhard
Goetz for the attempted murder of four Black teenagers who approached him for
money on a New York subway. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, (N.Y. 1986);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 206-08 (1988) (describing defense attorney's trial tactics that emphasized the
racial identity of the teenagers shot by Goetz).
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dividual's race in their decision to stop and detain him."4 Police
become suspicious of Blacks present both in a predominantly
white neighborhood and in a Black neighborhood with a high
crime rate."5 As Tracey Meares acknowledges, "[i]n the minds
of some law-enforcement agents, Black skin is considered a fac-
tor to use to decide whether an individual should be considered
a criminal suspect." 16 Courts have approved officers' use of race
in their determination that there is reasonable cause to suspect
an individual is involved in crime.
Police officers defend racial profiling as a useful crime de-
tection tool that is based on the disproportionate commission of
certain crimes by members of minority groups."" Gary McLhin-
ney, the president of the Baltimore Fraternal Order of Police,
explains: "Of course we do racial profiling at the train sta-
don.... If 20 people get off a train and 19 are white guys in
suits and one is a black female, guess who gets followed? If ra-
cial profiling is intuition and experience, I guess we all racial-
profile."" 9
This rationale fails to acknowledge, however, that most Blacks
do not commit crimes. Moreover, police apply racial profiling
... DAVID COLE, No EQUALJuSTCE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMInALJUSnTCE
SYSTEM 16-62 (1998) (discussing racial bias in consent searches, pretext stops, quality-
of-life policing, and drug courier profiles); RANDALL KENNEDY, RAE, CRIME, AND THE
LAW 136-67 (1997) (criticizing racially discrimination in investigative policing); Jeffrey
Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 51;
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 214
(1983); see also Wilgoren & Thompson, supra note 96 ("Among African-Americans,
the experience of having unwarranted run-ins with the police seems universal.").
"' MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 170 (1981); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 INDIANA L.J. 659 (1994). See United States v. Wil-
liams, 714 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding officer's decision to detain two
Black women during an investigation of a bank robbery based on the observation that
"it was 'rare' for black persons to be in the predominantly white neighborhood where
the robbery occurred").
", Meares, Social Organization, supra note 66, at 681.
"17 See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 391 (8th Cir. 1992) (including
among factors that created reasonable suspicion the fact that defendant was a
"'roughly dressed' young black male"); AngelaJ. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1661 n.5 (1996) (book review) (citing
cases in which courts approved of race as a factor in police decisions).
,18 Goldberg, supra note 114, at 56-57.
"9 Id. at 57.
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only to members of minority groups, and not to whites for the
crimes they commit in disproportionate numbers. In McLhin-
ney's example, the disproportionate conviction of Blacks for
drug offenses is not a basis for suspecting that the Black woman
on the train is a drug dealer, any more than the disproportion-
ate conviction of whites for securities fraud is a basis for suspect-
ing that the nineteen white businessmen are crooks. While the
white passengers enjoy the presumption of innocence, the Black
passenger is presumed to be lawless on account of her race.
The racial basis for suspicion is translated into the dispro-
portionate arrest of Black men and women for many crimes.
120
Two of the most glaring examples are pretextual traffic stops
and arrests for drug offenses.12' There is overwhelming evi-
dence that police officers stop motorists on the basis of race for
minor traffic violations.22 A 1992 Orlando Sentinel study of police
videotapes, for example, discovered that although Blacks and
Latinos represented only 5% of drivers on the Florida interstate
highway, they made up nearly 70% of drivers stopped by police
and more than 80% of those drivers whose cars were searched.'28
'2 See Racial Discrimination on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct 101
HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1508 (1988).
12' Davis, supra note 33, at 28-30.
12 See Maclin, supra note 45, at 344-54; COLE, supra note 114, at 34-41.
'23 SeeJeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, ORLANDO
SEN NEL, Aug., 23, 1992, at Al; Henry Pierson Curtis, Statistics Show Pattern of Dis-
crimination, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at All. For other studies showing ra-
cial bias in traffic stops, see John Lamberth, Driving While Black, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,
1998, at CI; Paul W. Valentine, Md. State Police Still Target Black Motorists, ACLU Says,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al. NewJersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman re-
cently conceded that "some state troopers singled out black and Hispanic motorists
on the highway, and that once they were pulled over, they were more than three
times as likely as whites to be subjected to searches." Iver Peterson, Whitman Concedes
Troopers Used Race In Stopping Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1999, at Al. See also David
Kocieniewski Trenton Charges 2 Troopers with Faking Drivers' Race; Case Is Seen as Evidence
of Racial Profiling, N.Y.TnEs, April 20, 1999, at A23 (reporting indictments of two New
Jersey state troopers accused of common practice of "falsifying documents to make it
appear that some of the black motorists they stopped were white" and noting that the
officers shot three unarmed men, two Black and one Hispanic, during a traffic stop);
David Kocieniewski, Drivers Tell of Racial Profiling by Troopers, N.Y. TIMES, April 14,
1999, at A24 (describing hearing held by Black and Latino Caucus of NewJersey Leg-
islature on allegations of racial profiling by state police and noting 1996 court deci-
sion finding "evidence of systemic discrimination by troopers against black
motorists").
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These race-based stops may amount to an inconvenience or a ci-
tation, or they may be an excuse to search for evidence of a
more serious crime.' 24 The experience of being stopped by po-
lice on account of race is so common that it is widely known in
the Black community as "DWB"--driving while Black.'2 District
Court Judge Nancy Gertner recently acknowledged this pattern
by reducing a Black defendant's sentence on the grounds that
his lengthy prior record was probably skewed by discriminatory
traffic stops. 1 26 Despite the evidence of racial bias, the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of pretextual
traffic stops.
27
Police officers also enforce the drug laws in a racially biased
manner. Although whites use drugs in far greater numbers
than Blacks, Blacks are far more likely to be arrested for drug
offenses. Blacks represent only 13% of the nation's drug users,
but make up 74% of those imprisoned for drug possession. 28
This gross racial disparity results in part from the conscious de-
cision of police departments to target their drug enforcement
efforts on urban and inner-city neighborhoods where people of
color live.'2 As journalist Jeffrey Goldberg notes, "[c] ommon
124 Davis, supra note 33, at 28-30.
'2 See David A. Harris, 'Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRmINoLOGY 544 (1997); David Cole,
"Driving While Black," Curbing Race-Based Traffic Stops, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at
A25.
' See United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998); Fox Butterfield, Bias
Cited in Reducing Sentence of Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at A22. Judge Gert-
ner reasoned that by taking racially-biased traffic convictions into account, the federal
sentencing guidelines overestimate the defendant's culpability and perpetuate racial
disparities in the state system. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 33. Black motorists have filed
numerous individual and class-action lawsuits against city and county officials charg-
ing racial bias in police traffic stops. Several have resulted in out-of-court settlements
agreeing to judicial monitoring of stops. Cole, supra note 125; KATHERYN K. RUSSELL,
THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HoAxES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE
HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGRESSIONS 40-43 (1998).
'" See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). For criticism of Whren for
failing to give African Americans a legal remedy for discriminatory police stops, see
Harris, supra note 125; Maclin, supra note 45; AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MAm L. REv. 425 (1997).
'" MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECt, YOUNG BLACKAMERICANS
AND THE CRIMINALJuSTICE SySTEM: FvEYEARS LATER 12(1995).
'i Davis, supra note 33, at 30.
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sense, then, dictates that if the police conducted pretext stops
on the campus of U.C.L.A. with the same frequency as they do
in South Central, a lot of whites would be arrested for drug pos-
session."'8 ° This blatant and persistent pattern of race-based ar-
rests-the expression of police officers' association of Blacks
with crime-is replicated in the enforcement of order.
3. The Ordinance's Social Influence
While exaggerating or misrepresenting the impact of disor-
der on crime rates, social norm theorists ignore the harm of
discriminatory government campaigns to eliminate disorder.
We can apply social norm theorizing to explain the negative so-
cial influence of race-based police harassment. Just as visible
disorder "tells" residents that the community is not enforcing
norms of orderliness, race-based policing tells the community
that Blacks are presumed to be lawless and are entitled to fewer
liberties. Order has social meaning, but so does order enforced
in this way.
Social norm theory is very useful in explaining how seem-
ingly trivial behavior can have huge social consequences. Be-
cause of its social meaning, conduct with little immediate
practical impact can have a significant effect on people's atti-
tudes about social norms. Social norms, in turn, have a power-
ful influence on individuals' behavior and community welfare.
The following figure depicts the argument asserting the
positive social influence of maintaining order.131
' Goldberg, supra, note 114, at 87. Police also impose a racial double standard in the
way they treat drug offenders whom they catch-"the way in which white drug users
know with near 100-percent certainty that they will never go to jail for marijuana pos-
session. How they know that they will never be jacked up during a pretext stop. How
white cops cut white kids a break." Id.
"' Bernard Harcourt also provides a helpful figure to illustrate the social influence
conception of deterrence. See Harcourt, supra note 6, at 308.
810 [Vol. 89
1999] FOREWORD: RACE & ORDER-MANTENANCE POLiCTNG 811
FIGURE 1:
THE POSITIVE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF ORDER-
MAINTENANCE POLICING
Police Social Social Impact on
Conduct-) meaning-> Norm-> Community
Police remove Community Orderliness Law-abiders feel
visible signs of cares & crimi- safe & criminals
disorder nals are no stop committing
longer in crimes
control
In the same way that minor infractions of order, such as loi-
tering, vandalism, or panhandling, can allegedly lead to serious
crime, minor infringements of citizens' liberties can cause seri-
ous damage to the relationship between government and the
governed and among citizens. This explains why seemingly triv-
ial police harassment, such as ordering someone to move along,
can be a significant infringement of liberty. Race-based harass-
ment helps to reinforce the second-class citizenship of Blacks
and other people of color.
In addition to reinforcing racist norms of presumed crimi-
nality, order-maintenance policing intensifies racial inequalities
in the protection of civil liberties. Distinguishing between citi-
zens on the basis of presumed criminality permits the state to
minimize the rights of presumably lawless citizens while expand-
ing the authority of presumably law-abiding ones. Once people
are categorized as lawless it becomes easy to strip them of their
liberties. As the city argued before the Supreme Court, "In or-
ganized society, the 'amenities' of some must sometimes be
regulated for the benefit of the community as a whole."132 The
1 Brief for the Petitioner at 42, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)
(No. 97-1121). See also Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 31, Morales, (No. 97-1121) (re-
ferring to police orders to disperse as a "minor inconvenience").
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constitutional freedoms of lawless people become mere "ameni-
ties" that may be sacrificed to protect law-abiding people.
The willingness to abrogate the rights of disorderly resi-
dents was especially evident in the city's nonchalant dismissal of
their freedom to travel: "If gang members and their associates
only obey orders to move along when issued-exercising the
very right to travel the Illinois Supreme Court supposed was in-
fringed by the ordinance-they will not be subject to arrest.'
3 3
This ludicrous convolution of the concept of rights applies only
to citizens deemed visibly lawless. Most Americans no doubt
would be offended by police orders to move along; they cer-
tainly would find it hard to see their compliance with such or-
ders as an exercise of liberty. We expect to find this kind of
Orwellian double think, confusing obedience to authority with
liberty, in totalitarian regimes. It is only the categorical separa-
tion of law-abiding and lawless citizens that permits the simulta-
neous commitment to liberal and totalitarian concepts of
freedom.'3 Law-abiding citizens can continue to frequent pub-
lic forums free from police interference, while lawless people
are justifiably subject to increasingly aggressive police surveil-
lance.
Because the distinction between law-abiding and lawless
people is racialized, the depreciation of liberty it legitimates is
equally racialized. As I discussed earlier, stereotypes of Black
criminality result in an ugly pattern of racist police abuse and
arrest. Social norm theory helps to explain why this pattern
strikes most Americans as benign. According to social norm
theorists, when social understandings are so uncontested that
they become invisible, the social meanings that arise from them
appear natural. "The more they appear natural, or necessary, or
uncontested, or invisible," Lawrence Lessig notes, "the more
powerful or unavoidable or natural social meanings drawn from
" Brief for the Petitioner at 40, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
" Scientific racism similarly accounted for the anomaly of slavery existing in a repub-
lic founded on a radical commitment to liberty, equality, and natural rights. This
contradiction necessitated the strict dichotomy between slaves and free men based on
the belief in the natural inferiority of Blacks and superiority of whites. Barbara
Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of America, 181 NEw LEFT
REv. 95 (1990).
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them appear to be.' 'ls Myths of Black criminality are so embed-
ded in the white psyche that it seems perfectly natural to many
Americans that Blacks are disproportionately stopped for traffic
infractions, arrested for drug offenses, swept off the streets for
loitering, and sent to prison.
It is helpful, then, to use social influence theory to elucidate
the pernicious impact of order-maintenance policing. Borrow-
ing the relationship between social meaning, social influence,
and social norms, we can see how social norm theory is just as
effective at critiquing order-maintenance policing as it is at sup-
porting it. My hypothesis, however, diverges from the broken
windows theory by recognizing that the categories of order and
disorder have a pre-existing meaning that associates Blacks with
disorder and lawlessness. The following figure depicts the social
influence of order-maintenance policing that incorporates these
racialized categories.
FIGURE 2:
THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF ORDER-
MAINTENANCE POLICING
Police Social Social Impact on
Conduct-> Meaning-> Norm-> Community
Racially- Blacks are Presumed Blacks are
biased arrests suspect, require Black perceived as
of loiterers police criminality criminals and
supervision, & experience
are entitled to more discrimi-
fewer liberties nation
Recent events in New York City suggest that its order-
maintenance policy had precisely this racist social meaning,
"' Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 960-61
(1995).
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which reinforced pernicious norms within the police depart-
ment. While officials boasted of falling crime rates, civilian
complaints of police abuse rose almost 40% since 1993 and the
amount the city paid to settle these claims doubled. 1 6  The
Street Crime Unit stopped and frisked 45,000 people in 1997
and 1998, but made only 9,500 arrests. 7 This means that police
detained more than 35,000 people-the vast majority Black and
Latino-who apparently had committed no crime.'s Shocking
cases of police brutality against innocent Black citizens height-
ened resentment toward the police and concerns about the
city's policing policy. The two most egregious were the beating
and torture of a Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, in 1997 by
two officers in a station house and the fatal shooting of a
Guinean immigrant, Amadou Diallo, in 1999 by four plain-
clothes officers from the Street Crime Unit, who fired forty-one
times at the unarmed man with no criminal record."9
Numerous observers hold New York City's order-
maintenance policy responsible for the escalation of police
abuse.14 The mandate to aggressively control disorderly behav-
ior created an attitude of impunity and disrespect for Black lives
among police officers that ultimately led to these violations.
The level of daily harassment, capped by the barbarity of the
Louima and Diallo cases, dramatically eroded support for New
"6 Matt Bai & Gregory Beals, A Mayor Under Seige, NEWSWEEK, April 5, 1999, at 40, 41.
117 Michael Cooper, Safir May Use Police Data to Back Unit, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1999, at
A23.
1' Id. These figures reflect an intensified version of the common practice of police,
dating back to the 1960's, to arbitrarily stop and frisk Black men. See Tracey Maclin,
Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1271, 1272-75 (1998).
' Bai & Beals, supra note 136, at 41;Joseph P. Fried & Blaine Harden, Officer Guilty of
Helping Torture Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at Al.
..0 See, e.g., Joel Berger, The Police Misconduct We Never See, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at
A23; Dan Berry, Leaders of Precinct Are Swept Out in Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1997, at Al; Bob Herbert, Beyond the Diallo Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1999, § 4, at 11;
Bob Herbert, Pushing People Around, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at A27. See also Jodi
Wilgoren, Police Profiling Debate: Acting on Experience, or on Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 9,
1999, at A21 (linking New York City's aggressive policing policy, racial profiling, and
police abuse; "[A] growing chorus of community leaders see a presumptive linking of
minorities to crime that has caused intolerable humiliation and physical abuse of in-
nocent citizens-even Mr. Diallo's death.").
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York City's quality-of-life initiative, especially among African
Americans, and sparked demands for tough oversight of police
conduct.1
4 1
In the same way that proponents of the broken windows hy-
pothesis measure the benefits of order-maintenance policing in
terms of falling crime rates, we can measure the harms of order-
maintenance policing in terms of the concrete impact of the ra-
cial stereotypes it perpetuates.'42 I suspect, however, that the
damage inflicted by the social norm of presumed Black crimi-
nality is immeasurable.
While high rates of incarceration for felonies have devastat-
ing repercussions on Black communities,143 widespread convic-
14' Bai & Beals, supra note 136, at 40 (describing demonstration at New York City Hall
following Diallo killing in which 1,000 protestors were arrested);Jodi Wilgoren, Thou-
sands Rally in Diallo's Memoy for Strong Oversight of Police, N.Y. TIMDEs, April 16, 1999, at
A21 (reporting four-hour rally at the Federal Plaza in New York City demanding 10-
point plan for police reform, including federal monitoring of police conduct). As Jo-
seph D. McNamara, a former police chief, writes, "When Amadeo Diallo died, so did
quality-of-life policing." Joseph D. McNamara, Giuliani Cop System Doesn't Wor, News-
day, April 15, 1999, (available at <http:// www.openair.org / alerts / artist /
nycmcnam.html>). McNamara argues that the Diallo killing occurred because
[Tihe four policemen indicted on murder charges, and their fellow officers, have
been conditioned to believe that quality of life policing-cracking down on minor viola-
tions by aggressively confronting people walking the streets of NewYork-is the way to re-
duce crime ... [which] reinforces a growing view among police officers that the public is
teeming with predatory criminals ....
lid
I14 See RussELL, supra note 126, at 138-48. Russell describes the harms created by racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system as "alienation, violence, community un-
rest, negative health consequences, and greater adherence to genocidal theories." Id.
at 148.
" See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization, supra note 66, at 205 (noting that tough
sentences produce negative consequences for community social organization in poor,
minority neighborhoods, including family disruption, unemployment, and low eco-
nomic status.) David Cole summarizes the alarming statistics regarding Black impris-
onment:
The per capita incarceration rate among blacks is seven times that among whites.
African Americans make up about 12 percent of the general population, but more than
half of the prison population. They serve longer sentences, have higher arrest and con-
viction rates, face higher bail amounts, and are more often the victims of police use of
deadly force than white citizens. In 1995, one in three young blacks between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine was imprisoned or on parole or probation. If incarceration rates
continue their current trends, one in four young black males born today will serve time
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dons for petty offenses also have a degrading impact. Criminal
conviction even for a misdemeanor places an individual more
definitively in the category of lawbreakers. Being arrested and
sent to jail is no picnic.'4 Many of the thousands of citizens ar-
rested under the Chicago ordinance were sentenced to a day or
more in Cook County Jail. Some were sent to jail for several
weeks.14 To diminish the seriousness of criminal arrest, prose-
cution, and incarceration for any amount of time reinforces the
view that these experiences should be considered routine for
Blacks. The arrests of more than 42,000 people in Chicago for
loitering "lower[s] at least the threshold of tolerance to penal-
ity" and "tends to efface what may be exorbitant in the exercise
of punishment."14 6 No doubt the formerly law-abiding citizens
among those harassed and arrested are less likely ever "to en-
gage positively" with the police. Although some social norm
theorists advocate order-maintenance policing as a gentler al-
ternative to draconian punishments and high incarceration
rates of young Black men,4 7 both policies have the effect of rein-
forcing stereotypes of Black criminality.
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan are willing to tolerate arrests
for loitering because they assume that " It] he kids whom the po-
lice cannot order off the streets today ... are the same ones they
will be taking off to jail tomorrow.",14 We should resist this as-
sumption. Not everyone the police suspect is a gang member or
everyone who associates with a suspected gang member is a
in prison during his lifetime (meaning that he will be convicted and sentenced to more
than one year of incarceration). Nationally, for every one black man who graduates
from college, 100 are arrested.
COLE, supra note 114, at 4-5.
' See Harcourt, supra note 6, at 381-82 (describing the ordeal of arrest for minor of-
fenses).
"' See, e.g., Robyn Blumner, Wen the Law is Based on Looks, ROCiY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
May 10, 1998, at 5B (describing arrest of Gregorio Gutierrez who was sentenced to 27
days in jail).
" MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPINE AND PUNISH 301 (1977).
,'7 See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 66; Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra
note 7; Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 77, at
213 ("Chicago's gang loitering ordinance is an example of a policy tool that is a tol-
erably moderate way to steer children away from criminality.").
.. Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking supra note 72, at 213.
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criminal. Meares and Kahan also assume that "[w]hen courts
strike down crime-preventive measures such as the ordinance,
legislatures inevitably attempt to compensate, with even more
severe prison terms."'49 There is evidence, however, that order-
maintenance policing initiatives foster increased police brutality
without any corresponding leniency in sentencing.5 0  While
crime rates have declined across the country, incarceration rates
have continued to soar. 5 Far from promoting community co-
operation with the police, moreover, New York City's aggressive
patrol tactics made many law-abiding citizens fearful of the po-
lice.5
Meares elaborates why tough sentencing for drug offenses is
ultimately counterproductive:
Unfortunately, by promoting stigmatization of all African Americans
and being insensitive to the dynamics of linked fate, and given the reality
of the difficulty of drawing lines between law abiders and law breakers in
many impoverished communities, it is likely that the racial asymmetry in
drug incarcerations that is the inevitable consequence of the current
drug law enforcement strategy undermines rather than enhances the de-
terrent potential of long sentences."53
Meares recognizes that all Blacks are stigmatized as law breakers
by a law enforcement strategy that produces prisons in which
half the inmates are Black.'5 4 The disproportionate incarcera-
tion of Blacks reinforces the stereotypical association between
Blacks and criminality. But the gang-loitering ordinance has
precisely the same stigmatizing effect. Although its penalties are
far less severe than those for drug dealing, the ordinance per-
mits police to remove and arrest perfectly law-abiding citizens
because their race makes them appear lawless. Thus, the "diffi-




, See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
5 Timothy Egan, Less Crime, More Criminals, N.Y. TIMEs, March 7, 1999, § 4, at 1; Fox
Butterfield, Number of Inmates Reaches Record 1.8 Million; Data Show Crime Rate Continues
to Decline, N.Y. TIMEs, March 15, 1999, at A14.
.. See Herbert, supra note 96.
"' Meares, Social Organization, supra note 66, at 213.
154 Id.
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Black communities becomes especially pernicious when police
are armed with a vague license to hassle and arrest. I submit
that the gang-loitering ordinance stigmatizes Blacks more di-
rectly than tough drug laws because it practically invites the po-
lice to intervene based on stereotypes of Black criminality and
disorderliness rather than any criminal conduct. The routine
and public display of this racist exercise of police power com-
pounds its negative impact.
Order-maintenance policing is connected to lengthy im-
prisonment in a more practical way, as well. Giving the police
broad authority to arrest based on mere suspicion increases the
likelihood that they will find evidence of more serious crimes.
When this authority is exercised in a racially biased manner, it
increases the racial disparity in convictions for other offenses.
Racial profiling becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: targeting
Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrests,
reinforcing the presumption of Black criminality. If police
stopped and frisked whites as frequently as they do Blacks, white
arrest rates would increase. Arrests for petty infractions such as
loitering, moreover, create a criminal record, which can en-
hance the penalty for more serious crimes. Order-maintenance
policing, then, is not a new regime that spares young Black men
from imprisonment. It is part and parcel of the old regime that
marks young Black men as criminals destined for prison.
In sum, social norm scholarship supporting order-
maintenance policing dramatically underestimates the cost of
giving the state leeway to restrain "visibly lawless" people. It
overlooks the dangers inherent in identifying a class of citizens
as "lawless" apart from their criminal conduct and it discounts
the harm of race-based enforcement. While focusing on the
negative social influence of community disorder, the broken
windows approach to crime prevention fails to see the negative
social influence of police strategies that rely on myths of Black
criminality.
IV. BLACK EMPOWERMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
I have argued that taking into account the race of the com-
munities affected most by Chicago's ordinance helps to explain
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the law's constitutional harm. The potential for racially-biased
law enforcement is one of the chief dangers addressed by
vagueness doctrine. Moreover, in deciding the constitutionality
of aggressive policing strategies we must be careful to calculate
accurately the costs of sacrificing liberty for the sake of order.
Social norm theory helps to explain the cost to Black Americans
of policing strategies that incorporate racialized categories of
orderly and disorderly people. But what if Black Americans are
willing to bear this burden as the price for keeping their neigh-
borhoods safe? Would Black endorsement of expanded police
discretion change the constitutional balance between liberty
and order?
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT AS BLACK LIBERATION
A growing branch of scholarship on race and the criminal
justice system emphasizes the benefit to Black communities of
tougher law enforcement. The decline in brutal police repres-
sion of Blacks in the wake of the civil rights movement com-
bined with the increase in Black-on-Black violence complicates
the unidimensional racial criticism of excessive law enforce-
ment. An alternative racial argument asserts that victimization
by criminals poses a greater threat to the well-being of Black
communities than does the risk of police abuse.55 The most in-
fluential articulation of this thesis is Randall Kennedy's book
Race, Crime, and the Law. Kennedy contends that "the principal
injury suffered by African Americans in relation to criminal mat-
ters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the
laws.', 56  According to this view, order-maintenance policing
corrects the under-enforcement of the criminal laws in Black
neighborhoods and protects their residents from the greater in-
157ternal danger caused by the high rates of crime.
"', KENNEDY, supra note 114, at 19; Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at
1166.
"6KENNEDY, supra note 114, at 19.
,17 Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1166. It is interesting to note,
however, that Kennedy co-authored an amicus brief opposing the Chicago ordinance.
See Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-
1121). See also Randall Kennedy, Guilty by Association, T-E AM. PROSPECr 66 (May-
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Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares combined this thesis with
social norm and political process theory to launch an attack on
current criminal procedure doctrine.' 8 Reversing the critical
version of the dynamic between Blacks and police authority,
they present order-imposing laws like the Chicago gang-
loitering ordinance as a reflection of Black political strength.
Kahan and Meares argue that the constitutional standards used
to evaluate these laws have outlived their utility and should be
replaced by a new criminal procedure regime that is less hostile
to police discretion.
The need for this doctrinal shift stems from changes in ra-
cial politics. According to Kahan and Meares, the current con-
stitutional rules that curb discretionary policing were part of the
civil rights revolution that sought to prevent the use of law en-
forcement as an instrument of racial repression. They allege
that today, however, more powerful Black communities are de-
manding law enforcement strategies such as anti-loitering laws
and curfews to eliminate visible signs of disorder from their
streets. When courts apply criminal procedure rules adopted in
the 1960s to thwart contemporary inner-city crime initiatives,
they supposedly are hurting Black citizens. Thus, Kahan and
Meares assert that "[a] body of doctrine designed to assure ra-
cial equality in law enforcement has now become an impedi-
ment to minority communities' own efforts to liberate
themselves from rampant crime."'' 9 Rules restricting police dis-
June, 1997) (criticizing California Supreme Court's decision in People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna upholding injunction against 38 individuals deemed to be members of a
criminal street gang).
" Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7; Meares & Kahan, The Wages of An-
tiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 72; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When
Rights Are Wrong: Chicago's Paradox of Unwanted Rights, 24 BosrON REv. 4 (April/May
1999). Kahan and Meares reiterate their argument in an amicus brief they filed in
Morales on behalf of twenty neighborhood organizations which backed the gang-
loitering ordinance. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Chicago Neighborhood Organizations
in support of Petitioners, Morales (No. 97-1121).
"' See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1154. Justice Clarence
Thomas dissented in Morales on similar grounds: "Today, the Court focuses exten-
sively on the 'rights' of gang members and their companions. It can safely do so-the
people who live with the consequences of today's opinion do not live in our neigh-
borhoods." Morales, 119 U.S. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting). A Chicago columnist
retorted, "True-and Clarence Thomas, ensconced in well-to-do Fairfax County, Va.,
will never be ordered to leave his front sidewalk for chatting with someone who, un-
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cretion used to protect Black citizens from racist law enforce-
ment practices, they contend; now these rules prevent Black
citizens from protecting themselves from gang violence.
The argument for order-maintenance policing grounded in
Black political empowerment must be taken seriously. It pres-
ents a significant challenge to my claim that vagueness doctrine
continues to serve a crucial function in curbing police abuse of
African Americans and the perpetuation of damaging stereo-
types of Black criminality. Implementing more pluralistic inter-
pretations of constitutional norms is a worthy project. Black
citizens' control of the political, cultural, and economic life of
their communities, moreover, is essential to Black liberation.10
An important part of this liberation project is to increase Black
citizens' participation in constructing responses to crime.
Kahan and Meares also correctly observe that racial politics
are more complicated today than at the time liberal criminal
procedure doctrines were instituted. But the increase in Black
political participation and shift from de jure discrimination to
other forms of institutional inequality does not erase the need
for these constitutional protections. To the contrary, the
changed conditions of American social and political life require
a constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes how seemingly
color blind laws continue to produce glaring racial inequities in
the criminal justice system. An important mechanism of this ra-
cial inequality is the social influence of police conduct that per-
petuates stereotypes of Black criminality.
Support by some Black inner-city residents for the gang-
loitering ordinance, moreover, does not determine its constitu-
tionality. As the next Part demonstrates, the claim that most in-
ner-city residents endorse the ordinance is itself hotly disputed.
Moreover, there is no democratic process in place empowering
Black communities to determine for themselves the content of
criminal procedure rights. Finally, the argument for a weak-
known to him, is a gang member." Steve Chapman, Court Upholds America's Right to
Hang Out, CHI. TRIB.,June 13, 1999, § 1, at 19.
" See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L. J.
1563, 1597-1602 (1996) (book review) (citing ROBERT ALEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN
CAITAIuSTAMEmCA (2d ed. 1970)).
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ened standard of protection from police abuse that applies par-
ticularly to Blacks reinforces the racial bias that taints the crimi-
nal justice system.
B. BLACK COMMUNITY OPINION ON THE GANG-LOITERING
ORDINANCE
The Black empowerment argument in favor of the ordi-
nance depends on the empirical claim that Black citizens who
are subject to the law support it. Kahan and Meares contend
that inner-city communities are willing to internalize the law's
deprivation of liberty in exchange for the increase in order, and
predicted reduction in crime, the law provides. Before proceed-
ing to the political and constitutional significance of Black
community preference, we should investigate the empirical
claim that the gang-loitering ordinance had "the overwhelming
support of inner-city residents." I61 In fact, a review of the legisla-
tive history reveals a complicated and diverse picture of Black
people's opinions on the matter. The Chicago Tribune described
the city council proceedings as "one of the most heated and
emotional council debates in recent memory.', 162 Casting that
debate as a conflict between white liberals who opposed the or-
dinance on civil liberties grounds and Black residents who de-
manded the ordinance to safeguard their neighborhoods, as
Meares and Kahan do, seriously mischaracterizes the range of
arguments expressed.163 There were academics, activists, and
residents of all backgrounds on both sides of the issue.
Some witnesses at the hearings on the proposed ordinance
supported the law because they believed it would eliminate the
intimidating presence of gang members in their neighbor-
161 See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1182 (asserting "the over-
whelming support of inner-city residents for the elements of the new community po-
licing"), see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in
Support of the Petitioner at 14, Morales (No. 97-1121) (stating that the gang-loitering
ordinance was "enacted at the behest of' minorities in Chicago).
16 Robert Davis, New Police Arrest Power Lights City Council Fuse, Cmr. TRB., June 18,
1992, § 1, at 1.
" Kahan and Meares castigate the Illinois ACLU for opposing the gang-loitering or-
dinance without taking into account the experiences of black inner-city residents.
Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1159-60.
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hoods.' 6 Others, however, seemed more concerned about the
impact that the public proximity of various types of socially un-
desirable people had on property values and business reve-
nues. 165 Several residents testified that they were frustrated by
the lack of police responsiveness to their complaints about ille-
gal activity on the part of gangs.'6 One witness stated, for ex-
ample, that when she complained about gang members blowing
whistles in her alley at night, a police officer responded that
"'until they break in and stab you, we aren't going to do any-
thing.' 167  But community outrage about gang criminality and
the police department's failure to combat it did not necessarily
translate into endorsement of the anti-loitering measure. An-
other witness, for example, noted that "people have to gather"
and expressed concern that the ordinance might be unfairly
applied to "young people on our block.., going to school" and
people "going shopping in the area ... even going to the bus
stop.
68
Any claim of Black community consensus begs the ques-
tions, what defines the community?, who represents the com-
munity?, and how are residents' voices counted? Because the
ordinance was proposed and passed by the Chicago City Coun-
cil, one relevant form of representation were the aldermen rep-
resenting the city's Black neighborhoods. This inquiry suggests
" For example, Jim Fields, Director of the Northwest Federation Coalition of Com-
munity Groups, testified that "[G]ang loitering is very intimidating. It prohibits...
people from using the park. It prohibits seniors from walking outside their door."
Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, Transcription of Proceedings
139 (May 15, 1992).
'" George Kyros, who represented the United Business Association of Woodlawn, tes-
tified that he supported the ordinance to combat "[c]orners loaded with either
gangs, professional gangs or to a lesser extent and probably to a more pitiful extent
the bottle gangs, which create just as bad a sight, just as bad on destroying our com-
munity as sophisticated street gangs." Id. at 65. Another witness complained that
"you can't cut through the alley because it's so many women with they babies out
there." I. at 122.
'' See id. at 95, 101, 108.
'"7 Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, Transcription of Proceedings
36 (May 18, 1992).
'" Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, Transcription of Proceedings
97-98 (May 15, 1992) (testimony of Velma Jetton). Ms. Jetton stated that she sup-
ported the ordinance, but wanted its language changed to avoid this potential un-
fairness. Id.
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that most of the Black community was opposed to the ordinance:
only six out the city's eighteen Black aldermen voted to pass the
gang-loitering law. 69 Several of the Black aldermen argued pas-
sionately that the ordinance hurt the interests of their constitu-
ents. Alderman John Steele declared that the law was "'drafted
to protect the downtown area and the white community' at the
expense of innocent blacks." 170 Alderman Dorothy Tillman
called the law "anti-American and anti-African American,"
claiming that it would "restrict the movement of young blacks in
a manner similar to the pass laws of South Africa." 71 One Black
alderman noted that there were already laws "dealing with
drugs, recruitment [and] intimidation" that were not being en-
forced, while another stated that the ordinance reminded him
of discriminatory "street sweeps" conducted by Chicago police
in the early 1980s.172
There was also a split in opinion among the grass-roots or-
ganizations that represent inner-city residents and that regularly
confront gang violence in Chicago. Kahan and Meares filed an
amicus brief in Morales on behalf of twenty civic, religious, and
other community groups throughout Chicago defending the
ordinance's constitutionality.7 3 They argued that these organi-
zations were in the best possible position to address the law's
practical impact because their members "are the ones who daily
face a heightened risk of criminal victimization from gang
criminality, and.., experience first-hand the destructive impact
of gangs-and more severe means of abating gangs-on the
lives of their communities." 74
Another group of organizations representing Black and La-
tino residents, however, filed an amicus brief challenging the
"' Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 5, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
'"Fran Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes, Cm. SUN-TIMES, June 18, 1992, at 16.
171 a
172 Brief of Respondents at 3, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
17 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Support of Peti-
tioner, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
'
74 Id. at 2.
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constitutionality of the ordinance. 75 One of the organizations,
The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS), is at
the forefront of efforts to implement community policing in
Chicago at the grass-roots level. CANS asserted that the ordi-
nance is "destructive of genuine community policing and ulti-
mately likely to make Chicago neighborhoods less safe." 76
CANS' opposition to the loitering ordinance reflects the posi-
tion of many of Chicago's major neighborhood-safety organiza-
tions, whose representatives sit on CANS' board of directors. 77
This amicus brief contended, moreover, that the ordinance had
"evoked substantial community opposition"'178 and that this op-
position "was especially intense in the African-American corn-
munity."' 9 It also disputed the claim that the ordinance was
enacted "at the behest of' minority residents:80 a neighborhood
federation based in a predominantly white section of the city
initiated the proposal, which was then drafted by several white
aldermen and endorsed by the mayor.""
At any rate, there is no systematic way of ensuring that the
predominantly Black neighborhood organizations that ratified
the ordinance represent a majority of inner-city residents. No
one polled these citizens to determine their sentiments about
's Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
76 Id. at 1.
'7 Id. at 1 n.4. Only one of these organizations dissented.
178 Ia at 3.
'79 Id. at 4.
'go Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Support of Peti-
tioner at 14, Morales, (No. 97-1121).
" Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. at 9-10, Morales (No. 97-
1121). See also Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, Transcription of
Proceedings 55-56 (May 15, 1992) (describing the role of the U.S. Department ofJus-
tice, Chicago Corporation Counsel, Chicago Police Department, and Illinois States'
Attorney in drafting the ordinance. But see Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated
Procedural Thinking, supra note 72, at 199 (stating that the representative of a pre-
dominantly Black ward, Alderman Beavers, sought to introduce the ordinance). Al-
bert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer strenuously dispute Meares and Kahan's
portrayal of community support for the ordinance. See Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra
note 24, at 217-20. They point out that Alderman Beavers forwarded the draft ordi-
nance to the full council only after it had been introduced six months earlier by white
aldermen. Alschuler and Schulhofer conclude that Meares and Kahan's claim that
inner-city residents favor the ordinance is "oversimplified and misleading." Id. at 220.
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the law, nor would such a poll necessarily provide a reliable in-
dication of community opinion.18 2 Without a mechanism for fair
representation, there is a grave danger that neighborhood
groups holding a minority view will become the self-proclaimed
voice of the community. Indeed, it seems likely that the neigh-
borhood associations that supported the ordinance gained le-
gitimacy and visibility precisely because of their alliance with the
police and city officials. Using their support of the ordinance as
an independent ground to defend deprivations of other resi-
dents' rights, therefore, is especially problematic.
Finally, the Black media, another vehicle for expressing
Black residents' views, appeared generally to oppose the law.
Chicago's leading Black newspaper, the Chicago Defender, con-
demned the ordinance in an editorial that boldly declared "Su-
preme Court Should Squash Anti-Gang Ordinance.' ' 3  One of
Chicago's most popular Black radio hosts also regularly spoke
out against the ordinance. 84
The conflicting opinions among Blacks about the wisdom of
the gang-loitering ordinance reflect a deeper ambivalence
among Blacks about law enforcement strategies. My sense, con-
firmed by survey research, is that despite their opposition to
neighborhood crime, most African Americans believe that the
criminal justice system is profoundly biased against them and do
not trust the police to fairly enforce the laws."'
"12 See David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Value of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2016 (1993) (stating
that "there is no way to poll the black community to determine their true desires").
See also Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 240-43 (noting difficulties in defin-
ing that relevant community).
"' Editorial, Supreme Court Should Squash Anti-Gang Ordinance, C-I. DEFENDER, April 23,
1998, at 11.
l CliffKelly Radio Show (WVON Chicago radio broadcasts, various dates).
"' See RUSSELL, supra note 126, at 35 (discussing surveys that demonstrate most Blacks
believe the police, and criminal justice systems are racially biased against them);
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"--Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U.L. REv. 243, 243-45 (1991). See also
Maclin, supra note 138, at 1279-87 (discussing history of resentment stop and frisk tac-
tics caused in Black neighborhoods). New York Times reporters who interviewed
more than 100 New York City residents following the police shooting of an unarmed
West African immigrant found "anger and fear mixed with sadness and suspicion as
people drew links between the shooting and their own lives." Wilgoren & Thompson,
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C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF BLACK
EMPOWERMENT
Even if it could be proven that a majority of Black inner-city
residents endorse the loitering law, what relevance would that
support have to the law's constitutionality? The racial argument
for relaxing procedural protections against police abuse hinges
on a controversial assessment of Black political empowerment.
According to Kahan and Meares, the implementation of aggres-
sive policing techniques in urban centers results from Blacks
"[f]lexing their newfound political muscle."' Increased Black
political strength after the civil rights movement, they argue,
means that inner-city residents are now involved in deciding po-
lice policy and in curbing police abuses. Close judicial monitor-
ing of police, based on the outdated assumption that white
majorities were imposing order on powerless minorities, is
therefore no longer necessary in today's political context. Po-
litical process theory suggests that less judicial scrutiny is needed
when average members of a community whose political repre-
sentatives passed an order-enforcing law bear the burden the
law imposes on individual freedom.
The application of political process theory to criminal pro-
cedure doctrine merits serious consideration. As I discussed in
Part II, the constitutional prohibition against vague allocations
of police authority stems partly from the fear that this discretion
will be used to repress minority groups. But political process
theory does not support relaxing constitutional scrutiny of the
gang-loitering ordinance or other order-maintenance policing
strategies. To the contrary, the racial divide between those who
enacted the law in Chicago and those who were burdened by it
calls for heightened judicial skepticism.. The gang-loitering or-
dinance was passed by the predominantly white Chicago City
Council, not an inner-city political body. Elected officials of
white districts enacted the ordinance while minority communi-
ties were disproportionately subjected to the violations of liberty
it imposed. Most of the political representatives of the Black
supra note 96. A 20-year-old Black construction worker from Brooklyn told the re-
porters "he feels safer at night passing the projects than the local police station." Id.
'" Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1154.
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communities affected by the ordinance opposed it. Relatively
few white Chicagoans, on the other hand, risked being arrested
for standing on the streets of their neighborhoods: by centering
on suspected gang members and their companions, the very
terms of the law applied virtually to minorities only. Although
Black citizens certainly influence politics in cities like Chicago,
they do not (yet) determine, design, or implement the law en-
forcement policies that govern their communities. s7
A more realistic view of the political process suggests that
white support for tougher police supervision of Blacks helped to
guarantee the law's passage, despite vehement opposition by
many Black representatives. The jurisprudence of racial realism
posits that white Americans have repeatedly sacrificed Black
people's rights to maintain their privileged position; legal
measures that improve Black people's status are implemented
only if they also further the interests of the white majority1,
Whites embrace law enforcement strategies to crack down on
Black criminals that converge with white interests in reducing
crime while preserving their own individual freedoms. Propos-
als for increased Black control over criminal justice decision
making that threaten white supremacy, on the other hand, are
soundly condemned as radical nonsense. The enthusiasm
whites have for order-maintenance policing is not extended to,
for example, Paul Butler's recommendations that Black jurors
engage in race-based nullification 89 or that Black criminal de-
' See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 221-22 (describing control of Chi-
cago's city government by whites, despite election of African American mayor in
1983).
' See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
189 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). For a critique of Butler's jury nullification proposal and
Butler's reply, see Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Re-
sponse to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996), and Paul Butler, The Evil of
American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1996) [hereinafter Butler, The
Evil of American Criminal Justice]. Butler's response to Leipold's fear of a white back-
lash to Black jury nullification is particularly relevant to this discussion: "If African
Americans adapted their political and self-help strategies so as not to raise the possi-
bility of white backlash, they would scarcely advance at all." Butler, The Evil of Ameri-
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fendants have the right to majority Black juries that are author-
ized to sentence them.'9 There is a dramatically different re-
sponse to Black self-help strategies that would escalate arrests of
Blacks and suspend their civil liberties versus those that might
result in greater leniency toward Black offenders. I would ven-
ture that most white Americans find the notion of putting law
enforcement in the hands of Black communities downright ter-
rifying. Witness the angry reaction of many white Americans to
the acquittal of oJ. Simpson of murder by a predominantly
Blackjury.19'
Moreover, recent events refute Meares and Kahan's san-
guine view of "the competence of inner-city communities to
protect themselves from abusive police behavior."192 Cases of
horrible police mistreatment of Blacks have dominated Chi-
cago's political landscape over the last few years 19 Human
Rights Watch recently highlighted police brutality in Chicago in
a report on excessive force in U.S. cities in the 1980s and 1990s,
citing the 1997 beating of Jeremiah Mearday, who is Black, by
can Criminal Justice, supra, at 155. Butler contends that many Black Americans side
with him. Id. at 147.
" See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. CoLO. L. Rav. 841,
877, 880-82 (1997). Butler advocates an affirmative action program for Black crimi-
nal defendants that also provides that Black people not be sentenced to death for in-
terraccial homicide; that Blacks be arrested and sentenced to prison for drug offenses
only in proportion to their actual commission of those crimes (no more than 12% of
the total); and that a goal for 2000 should be a prison population that more accu-
rately reflects the proportion of Blacks in the general population. See idl at 877.
.. See RuSSELL, supra note 126, at 47-55; Henry L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at
a Black Man, NEwYORXER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56.
See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1154.
See Steve Mills, One Step to Reform: 2 Steps Back Corruption, Brutality Charges still Tar-
nish Police, CmI. TRm., Feb. 11, 1999, § 1, at 1 (describing recent incidents of police
misconduct in Chicago and asserting that "community trust in the police is eroding in
some of the city's most troubled neighborhoods, threatening to undercut the de-
partment's community policing program."). As noted above, New York City is expe-
riencing a similar epidemic of race-based police abuse--"killings, the torturing of
Abner Louima, the invasions of rampaging cops of the apartments of innocent fami-
lies, the routine beatings and harassment of young men and boys, the curses and the
racial slurs, the arrests on phony charges of individuals who dare to object to abusive
treatment and more." Herbert, supra note 96, at A31. See also Deborah Sontag & Dan
Barry, Challenge to Authority: A Special Report; Disrespect as Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y.
TIms, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al (describing numerous cases of police abuse of New York-
ers who challenged police authority).
DOROTHYE. ROBERTS [Vol. 89
two white police officers.1 4 Lawsuits have confirmed numerous
complaints about the systematic torture of suspects at an inner-
city police station from 1973 to 1986.195 Perhaps most emblem-
atic of the police department's willingness to assume Black
criminality was the arrest of two Black little boys, ages seven and
eight, for the brutal sexual assault and murder of an eleven-year-
old Black girl in July 1998.196 Despite community protest over
officers' unethical means of extracting "confessions" from the
children, charges were dropped only after tests revealed the
boys were too young to commit the crime.97 A year later, in
separate incidents in June 1999, Chicago police officers fatally
shot two unarmed Black motorists, La Tanya Haggerty, a 26-
year-old computer analyst, and Robert Russ, a Northwestern
University senior.198
' Lynn Sweet, Rights Group Notes City's Police Abuse, Ci. SUN-TIM:Es, July 8, 1998, at 22.
The Human Rights Watch report notes that between 1992 and 1997, the city paid
more than $29 million in settlements stemming from 1,657 lawsuits alleging excessive
force, false arrest, and improper search. Id.
"' See Robert Blau & David Jackson, Police Study Turns Up Heat on Brutality, CHI. TRI.,
Feb. 9, 1992, § 1, at 1. See also People v. Cannon, 688 N.E. 2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (vacating denial of motion to suppress evidence of confession based on newly
discovered evidence showing 28 suspects were tortured at Chicago police station
where defendant was interrogated).
1 6 SeeJonathan Eig, Making Them Talk, Ci. MAG., Jan. 1, 1999, at 50. The family of
the eight-year-old filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police De-
partment, and two officers who interrogated the boys alleging false arrest and impris-
onment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Matt
O'Connor & Teresa Puente, 8-Year-Old's Family Sues Over Arrest for Murder, CI-m. TaM.,
Feb. 18, 1999, § 2, at 1.
1 7Tests revealed semen on the victim's underwear, which the boys were incapable of
producing. O'Connor & Puente, supra note 196.
' Todd Lighty & Gary Marx, Questions, Protest Cloud Cop Shootings, CHI. TRm., June 8,
1999, § 2, at 1. That same month, the U.S. attorney's office initiated an inquiry into
the 1996 killing of another unarmed Black motorist, Emmett Blanton,Jr., by Chicago
police officers, and the Cook County medical examiner ruled the death of a sus-
pected drug dealer, Gregory Ryan, during a struggle with police a homicide. Steve
Mills & Todd Lighty, Cop-Linked Death Ruled a Homicide, CI. TRm., June 19, 1999, § 1,
at 1; Todd Lighty & Liam TA. Ford, Police Face New Probe for 1996 Killing, Ci. Tam.,
June 11, 1999, § 2, at 1. As I completed this Foreword in the spring and summer of
1999, I recorded an alarming explosion of police brutality against Blacks across the
country, including several killings of unarmed individuals in New York City, Chicago,
and Los Angeles. See suprxr sources cited supra note 139; Todd S. Purdum, A Police
Shooting Death, a Study in Contrasts, N.Y.TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A9 (reporting the fatal
shooting in Los Angeles of Margaret Laverne Mitchell, a 55-year-old homeless
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Unfortunately, law enforcement continues to play "a central
role in maintaining the exclusion of African-Americans and
other minorities from the Nation's political life."'9 Political
process theory and democratic ideals mandate attention to
Black residents' views about criminal justice in inner-city com-
munities. They do not justify, however, the dilution of constitu-
tional protections against police departments that still enforce
the criminal laws in a racially-biased manner.
The question whether an autonomous Black community
that enacted its own laws and controlled its own police force
could adjust the current constitutional balance between liberty
and order is an intriguing hypothetical question.2 But given
the relative political disenfranchisement of Black inner-city resi-
dents, it is only a hypothetical question. Increasing Black politi-
cal power is not the occasion for the demise of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure protections.20 1  That trend started
woman, who police say brandished a screwdriver when 2 officers approached her to
ask her whether the shopping cart she was pushing was stolen).
'" See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1156. See also Alschuler &
Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 238 ("Anyone who contends that the 'institutionalized
racism' of American police departments has vanished does not read the newspa-
pers.").
20 Similar questions arise in applying constitutional rules to decisions by sovereign
Indian tribes. SeeJill E. Adams, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Tribal
Interests in a Land ofIndividual Rights, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 301 (1994) (discussing the
conflict between parents' constitutional rights and tribal sovereignty in issues involv-
ing Indian children); James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to
Indian Tribes, 59 MoNT. L. REv. 51 (1998). Moreover, legal protections against arbi-
trary official power may be unnecessary, and even harmful, in community-controlled
programs that minimize hierarchical distance between those in authority and those
served. Richard Boldt argues, for example, that federal confidentiality provisions that
reflect liberal legalism's abhorrence of official discretion undermine helpful commu-
nication between staff members and parents at Head Start centers. See Richard C.
Boldt, A Study in Regulatory Method, Local Political Cultures, and Jurisprudential Voice: The
Application of Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head Star 93 MIcH. L. REv. 2325
(1995). The stark difference between Head Start staff-parent relationships based on
"a strong commonality of interest and experience," id at 2363, and the largely an-
tagonistic relationship between police and inner-city residents helps to illuminate why
official discretion should be allowed in one context and restrained in the other.
21 See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 7, at 1154 (asserting that "[t]he
occasion for the current doctrine's demise, we predict, will be the political revolution
that's now remaking urban law enforcement").
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two decades ago and was hardly initiated by Blacks.0 2 The Court
has already relaxed the Tery standard for reasonable suspicion
in deference to law enforcement concerns in ways that promote
the arrest of Blacks and Latinos. 2 ' The retrenchment in crimi-
nal procedure protections is more accurately attributed to a
conservative backlash against Black political advancement com-
bined with the get-tough-on-crime politics of the Reagan and
succeeding administrations. °4 If vague loitering laws are upheld
as constitutional it would pull out one more thread from the
rapidly unraveling quilt of constitutional safeguards against po-
lice abuse implemented during a bygone era.
In short, the political process required for political process
theory to support the ordinance simply does not exist. There is
no secure means for determining Black citizens' opinions about
aggressive policing, let alone a democratic process for imple-
menting them. It is therefore highly presumptuous to claim that
inner-city residents have voluntarily relinquished their civil lib-
erties in exchange for safer streets. Given the political vulner-
ability of Blacks and persistent bias against them by the police;
given the damaging social meaning of order-maintenance polic-
ing; and given the danger of arguments advocating further dep-
rivation of Black citizens' freedoms, those who use racial politics
202 See CoLE, supra note 114, at 6 ("At virtually every juncture since Gideon and
Miranda, the Supreme Court has undercut the principle of equality reflected in those
decisions.... Today those decisions stand out as anomalies").
203 Harris, supra note 125, at 560-73; Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of
Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk," 50
ORLA. L. REV. 451 (1997); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken
Promises: The Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. LJ. 567 (1991).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a police officer to stop and
frisk suspects without probable cause if he has reasonable and articulable suspicion
that "criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous."). Tracey Maclin argues that Teny itself "deserves
critical attention because it authorized a police practice that was being used to sub-
vert the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks nationwide." Maclin, supra note 138, at
1277.
See generally Michael C. Dawson, Black Power in 1996 and the Demonization of African
Americans, 29 POL. SC. & Pol. 456, 458-60 (1996) (describing that marginalization of
African Americans in mainstream democratic politics since the 1970s that has "dis-
rupted black political aspirations and weakened black power since the end of the civil
rights and black power eras.").
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to defend weakening rights should bear a heavy burden of
proof. They have failed to make their case.
V. CONCLUSION: SACRIFICING BLACK FREEDOMS FOR THE PUBLIC
GOOD
The Chicago gang-loitering ordinance can be seen as a
state-sponsored experiment that tests the broken windows hy-
pothesis in inner-city communities using an especially broad
grant of police power. This brand of community policing is part
of a broader practice of experimenting with solutions to social
problems at the expense of Black citizens' liberties. Protecting
white people's liberties, on the other hand, usually takes prece-
dence over efforts to institute substantive racial equality.2°5 Ar-
guments that white Americans should relinquish a piece of their
liberty for the sake of creating a more egalitarian society are re-
nounced as reverse discrimination. At the same time, proposals
that restrict Black Americans' freedoms to improve public wel-
fare span the arenas of crime control, welfare reform, reproduc-
tive health policy, and child protection.
I have documented elsewhere the proliferation of policies
that seek to influence Black women's reproductive decision
making based on the misguided premise that decreasing Black
fertility can achieve positive social objectives.2 °  States are ex-
perimenting with so-called family caps to see if they deter wel-
fare mothers from having more babies.0 7 A major newspaper
proposed experimenting with incentives to use the long-acting
contraceptive Norplant to see if they would reduce Black pov-
erty. °8 Prosecutors have charged Black mothers with fetal
crimes to see if it will deter crack use during pregnancy.2° New
York City recently extended the broken windows philosophy to
its child protection policy, implementing a campaign of arrest-
... See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of Equality,
57 U. PrIT. L. REV. 363 (1996).
2w See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
"7 Id. at 202-45.
'Id. at 106-08 (discussing Donald Kimelman, Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception
Reduce the Underclass?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18).
Id. at 150-201.
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ing primarily Black and Latina mothers for misdemeanor child
endangerment on the theory that it will deter more serious
child abuse.
2 10
The Constitution places limits on the government's ability
to conduct social experiments that sacrifice minority freedoms
to enhance the welfare of the majority. Without this restraint,
the most powerful members of society would freely tinker with
social programs designed to improve their own welfare but bur-
den only minority groups. As Paul Butler notes about the dis-
proportionate imprisonment of Blacks for drug offenses, "the
luxury of maintaining a failed experiment in public policy can
be appreciated only by those who do not bear the brunt of the
failure."
212
Whether or not the gang-loitering ordinance was approved
by Black residents, its enactment depended on confining its
deprivation of liberty to minority communities. It is a perfect
example of the mechanism that perpetuates a criminal justice
system that brutally punishes Blacks while preserving white
Americans' civil liberties. The criminal law has resolved the ten-
sion between liberty and order by protecting the freedoms of
white citizens while enforcing order against Blacks. David Cole
argues that the criminal justice system affirmatively exploits this
inequality: "[a]bsent race and class disparities, the privileged
among us could not enjoy as much constitutional protection of
our liberties as we do; and without those disparities, we could
not afford the policy of mass incarceration we have pursued
210 Rachel L. Swarns, In a Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES, October 25, 1997, at Al. Examples of offenders include Sourette Alwysh, a 34-
year-old Haitian immigrant, who "was arrested for living with her 5-year-old son in a
roach-infested apartment without electricity or running water," and Sidelina Zuniga,
a 39-year-old Mexican immigrant, who was charged for leaving her sons, ages 10 and
four, at home for an hour and a half while she shopped at a grocery store. Id.
"' See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down eugenic law that im-
posed involuntary sterilization of certain criminals).
2 Butler, The Evil of American CriminalJustice, supra note 189, at 153. Butler notes the
reluctance of white Americans to use the criminal law to deal with their own drug use
while supporting imprisonment of Blacks for drug offenses. Id. at 149 (noting that
"African Americans account for only 13% of drug users, and yet make up 74% of the
people who are incarcerated for drug use").
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over the past two decades."213 The gang-loitering ordinance that
targets Chicago's minority youth similarly exploits America's ra-
cial divide, continuing to "sidestep [] the difficult question of
how much constitutional protection we could afford if we were
willing to ensure that it was enjoyed equally by all people."1 4
White citizens expect police to protect their neighborhoods
from crime without infringing their freedom to travel on public
streets or to be safe from arrest because of the way they look.
Black citizens deserve no less.
There is no consensus among Black scholars, politicians, or
inner-city residents about the law enforcement policies that will
best serve Black people's interests. Yet it remains possible to
evaluate these policies based on whether they further racial
subordination or help to eradicate it. This decision is essentially
a moral rather than a democratic one.1 Scholars who advocate
expanding police authority over Black communities have
gravely underestimated the abiding antagonism between law en-
forcement and Blacks in America. These social norm theorists
have misjudged the social meaning of aggressive policing and
the way it influences racialized norms of criminal justice. Con-
trary to the prevailing faith in the positive influence of order-
maintenance policing, this strategy-especially vague loitering
2" COLE, supra note 114, at 5.
2" Id. A police officer responding to Blacks who resisted aggressive patrol tactics used
in the 1960's poignantly expressed the tension between crime control in Black neigh-
borhoods and Black rights:
It's harder to work in these neighborhoods now than it used to be because we
send the kids to school and teach them about rights and then put them back in the
neighborhood. I think we ought to either get rid of these neighborhoods or stop teach-
ing these kids about their rights.
Maclin, supra note 138, at 1271 (quoting JEROME H. SKOLNIC, JUSTIcE WrITOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCmTw 88 (2d ed. 1975)).
2" See Butler, The Evil of American CriminalJustice, supra note 189, at 147-48 (noting that
his defense of jury nullification is based on the moral case against racism in the
criminal justice system rather than democratic consensus among Blacks). Of course,
these two aspects of the problem-morality and democracy-are related in the ques-
tion, "who should be empowered to make that moral judgment?" See Tracy L
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Meares and Kahan Respond, 24 BOSTON REV. 22, 22-23
(April/May 1999). At this stage, we must rely more on moral argument than evi-
dence of democratic decisionmaking within Black communities.
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laws-reinforces stereotypes that portray Blacks as lawless and
legitimate police harassment in Black communities. The racism
that pervades the criminal justice system demands innovations
that will give Blacks greater say in crime control strategies de-
ployed in their communities. This project requires that we
strengthen constitutional safeguards against race-based police
abuse, not eviscerate them.
